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NOTES

The Irish Abortion Debate:

Substantive Rights and Affecting
Commerce Jurisprudential Models
ABSTRACT

This Note examines the balance of power between the
European Community and its Member States through the
window of the Irish abortion debate. The frameworkfor that
debate has been shaped largely by two judicial bodies: the
Irish judiciary and the European Court of Justice (ECJ), the
judicial arm of the European Community. The Irishjudiclary
has approachedthe abortionquestion through an analysis of
the content of substantive Individual rights protected by the
Irish Constitution. The ECJ, on the other hand, has
addressed abortion from the standpoint of the European
Community's goal of uninhibited commerce between Member
States. These two approaches have produced different sets
of protected rights related to abortion. The need to choose
one set or the other drove Ireland to referendum In 1992, and
the Irish people chose the package of rights protected by the
ECJ's "affecting commerce"jurisprudentialmodel. This Note
analyzes and compares the affecting commerce model and
the Irishjudiciary's "substantive rights" model as applied to
abortion. The Author concludes that the adoption by Ireland
of the abortion rights protected under the affecting commerce
model, although it may end some confusion, may be
indicative of a shift in the power to define the scope of
importantpersonal libertiesfrom Member States to the central
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authority of the European Community. This centralization
may be beyond the original contemplation of the states that
Joined toform the Community.

TABLE OF CONTENTS
I.

II.

........................................................

1119

THE IRISH CONSTITUTION AND JUDICIAL REVIEW ............

INTRODUCTION

1122

A.

The Irish Constitution: History and Content..
JudicialReview in the Irish JudicialSystem...

1122
1123

THE IRISH SUBSTANTIVE RIGHTS MODEL: CONTENT
AND DEVELOPMENT ....................................................

1124

B.
III.

A.
B.
C.
IV.

THE IRISH SUBSTANTIVE RIGHTS MODEL AND ABORTION..

A.

V.

B,

Attorney General v. Open Door Counselling.
1. The High Court's Opinion ......................
2. The Supreme Court's Opinion ................
SPUC v. Grogan: Access to Services .............

C.

Attorney General v. X:

1125
1126
1129
1130
1131
1132
1133
1135

Balancing Directly

Competing Interests........................................
1. The High Court's Reasoning ...................
2. The Supreme Court's Reasoning ............
a. The Power of the Judiciary ...............
b. Balancing the Competing Interests...
c. Extraterritoriality and the
Right to Travel .................................
d. Applicability of European
Community Law ...............................

1136
1137
1138
1139
1140

THE ECJ AND THE AFFECTING COMMERCE MODEL .........

1143

A.
B.
VI.

Ryan v. Attorney General ..............................
McGee v. Attorney General ............................
The 1983 Amendment: Reaction to McGee ....

The ECJand ProtectingServices
Jurisprudence................................................
The SPUC v. Grogan Decision........................

ANALYSIS: THE AFFECTING COMMERCE AND
SUBSTANTIVE RIGHTS MODELS COMPARED ............... I....

A.

1142
1143
1144
1146
1149

Implications of the ECJ'sAffecting Commerce

Model................................................
1150

B.
C.
VII.

Implications of the Irish Substantive Rights
Model ..............................................................
The Referendum: Choosing a Model ..............

CONCLUSION

........................................................

1155
1158
1159

1994]

IRISH ABORTION DEBATE
I.

1119

INTRODUCTION

In the last thirty years the judicial arm of the United States
has demonstrated two ways in which a judiciary may expand the
protections afforded to the personal rights of citizens. First, the
judiciary may extend the Constitution's coverage of personal
rights by discovering unenumerated, implicitly protected
substantive rights.1 Second, a court may indirectly extend the
Constitution's reach under the "affecting commerce" model by
rights as constitutionally protected commercial
treating personal
2
relationships.
The European Court of Justice (ECJ), the judicial branch of
the European Community, 3 and the domestic courts of the European Community Member States also have employed the sub-

1.
In the mid-1960s, the United States Supreme Court embarked on a reexploration of the Bill of Rights' substantive content, discovering additional,
See, e.g..
unenumerated, but constitutionally protected, personal liberties.
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (holding that zone of privacy created
by unenumerated constitutional guarantees prohibits state from criminalizing use
of contraceptives by married persons); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972)
(extending right of privacy to the decision whether to bear or beget a child); Roe v.
Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (extending right of privacy to a woman's decision
whether or not to terminate her pregnancy); see also LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERiCAN
CONSTITUTIONAL LAw § 15-10 (2d ed. 1988); LAURENCE H. TRIBE. ABORTION: THE
CLASH OFABSOLUTES 93-94 (1990).
In NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937), the United
2.

States Supreme Court first employed the affecting commerce rationale to justify
regulating activities on the basis of their practical effect on interstate commerce.
The language
GERALD GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 128 (12th ed. 1991).
"affecting commerce" was- drawn from the National Labor Relations Act of 1935,
the statute challenged in the case. Jones & Laughlin Steel, 301 U.S. at 6-7.
Section 2(7) of the National Labor Relations Act defined "affecting commerce" as
"in commerce, or burdening or obstructing commerce or the free flow of
commerce, or having led or tending to lead to a . . . dispute burdening or
obstructing commerce or the free flow of commerce." Id.
At the same time the United States Supreme Court began exploring the extent
of unenumerated substantive rights relating to privacy and procreation, it also
sought to ensure other personal liberties under the Commerce Clause by striking
down prejudicial practices which interfered with interstate commerce. Congress'
power to regulate via the Commerce Clause provided the constitutional foundation
for the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. GUNTHER, supra,at 145-51; TRIBE,
AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAw, supra note 1, § 5-6. The Supreme Court upheld
the constitutionality of the Civil Rights Act as a proper exercise of Congress'
Commerce Clause power under a test that inquired, first, whether the regulated
activity affected interstate commerce and, second, whether the activity had a
substantial relation to the national interest. Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S.
294, 301-05 (1964); Heart of Atlanta Motel v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 255262 (1964).
GEORGE A. BERMANN ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON EUROPEAN COMMUNITY
3.
LAW 69 (1993).
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stantive rights and affecting commerce models as means of
protecting individual rights. As an entity created primarily for
economic reasons, the European Community does not purport to
offer personal freedoms to its citizens and places the main
responsibility for guaranteeing protection of individual rights on
the separate Member States. 4 The freedoms protected by the
European Community relate almost exclusively to its goal of
economic integration,5 and the ECJ has relied upon the affecting
commerce model to further that goal.
Although the courts of Member States have allowed the ECJ
to remove economic roadblocks between states, these courts have
not abdicated their role as interpreters of their own constitutions.
Domestic courts of Member States continue to define the content
of their respective constitutions by examining the substantive
guarantees that they contain. 6 Despite the ECJ's use of the
affecting commerce model, domestic courts have preserved the
7
vitality of the substantive rights jurisprudential model.
The European Community's jurisdictional mandates and the
continuing role played by the domestic courts of Member States
allow the possibility that the ECJ and a Member State's court
could adjudicate the same issue using two different jurisprudential models. The recent abortion debate in Ireland provides an
example of the simultaneous application of the substantive rights
and affecting commerce models to the same Issue. In considering
the Irish government's ability to limit access to abortions, Irish
courts engaged in a painstaking analysis of the nature of
individual substantive rights guaranteed by their constitution. 9
By contrast, the ECJ characterized the Irish abortion debate as
implicating economic rights relating to unencumbered
transborder access to goods and services. L° The application of
the two models has provided two distinct jurisprudential frameworks for considering the related issues of whether to allow

4.
Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community, Mar. 25, 1957,
298 U.N.T.S. 11 [hereinafter EEC Treaty]. The EEC Treaty contains no equivalent
to the United States Constitution's Bill of Rights. Diarmuid Rossa Phelan, Right to
Life of the Unborn v. Promotionof Trade In Services: The EuropeanCourt of Justice
and the Normative Shaping of the European Union, 55 MOD. L. REV. 670, 676-77
(1992).
5.
JOSEPHINE STEINER, TEXTBOOK ON EEC LAw 6-7 (3d ed. 1992).
6.
See generally HENRY G. SCHERMERS & DENIS F. WAELBROECK, JUDICIAL
PROTECTION IN THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES 386-90 (5th ed. 1992).

7.
Id. at 116. This preservation has been accomplished implicitly by means
of the continued resort to the domestic legal order by the national judiciaries of
the Member States. Id.
8.
See Infra part V.A.
9.
See infra part IV.
10. See infra part V.B.
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abortions in Ireland and whether to allow women to travel abroad
to receive abortions. 1 In turn, these models have shaped the
nature of the Irish political debate on abortion.
This Note examines the substantive rights and affecting
commerce models as applied to the issue of the availability of
It explores the
abortion both inside and outside Ireland.
evolution of the two approaches and compares their implications
for the protection of individual Ifights. Part II considers the Irish
Constitution's substantive guarantees and the scope of Irish
judicial review. Next, Part Ill presents the evolution of the Irish

judiciary's

inquiry

into

the

constitutional

protection

of

unenumerated substantive rights, and Part IV discusses the Irish
judiciary's use of the substantive rights approach in the context
of abortion. In Part V, the Note turns to the commercial rights
and freedoms guaranteed under the EEC Treaty and the ECJ's
application of the affecting commerce model to European
Community legal questions raised by Irish abortion regulations.
Part VI weighs the relative merits of the Irish and European
models and their place in the larger scheme of a unified Europe.
The results of the November 1992 referendum, through which
Irish voters presented with the competing visions of these models
chose to elevate to constitutional status the package of rights
protected under the affecting commerce approach, are also
examined in Part VI. The Note concludes that, while the affecting
commerce referendum result ironically may have provided the
Irish judiciary with new guidance as to the abortion-related
substantive protections available under the constitution, the
larger implications of the affecting commerce model are
potentially troublesome for the future balance of power between
the European Community central government and Member
States.

11.

The number of Irish women travelling to the United Kingdom each year

to obtain abortions has grown significantly
the number of abortions performed on Irish
years 1968 through 1991 are as follows:
577; 1972-974; 1973-1192; 1974-1406;

in recent years. Official statistics for
women in the United Kingdom for the
1968-64; 1969-122; 1970-261; 19711975-1572; 1976-1802; 1977-2183;

1978-2533; 1979-2767; 1980-3380; 1981-3598; 1982-3650; 1983-3677; 19843946; 1985-3887; 1986-3918; 1987-3673; 1988-3839; 1989-3721; 1991-4152.
These figures actually may underrepresent the true numbers because many
abortions may not be reported. Peter Charleton, Judicial Discretion In Abortiorn
The Irish Perspective, 6 INT'L J. L. & FAM. 349, 365-66 (1992) (compiling statistics

of the United Kingdom Office of Censuses and Surveys).
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II. THE IRISH CONSTITUTION AND JUDICIAL REVIEW
A. The Irish Constitution: History and Content
The text of the current Irish Constitution prominently reflects

Ireland's peculiar history and social makeup. First conquered by
the English in 1171,12 Ireland existed uneasily for centuries as a
colony under the rule of the British Crown. i 3 Independence for

the Republic of Ireland was achieved in 1937 when the populace

ratified a constitution that created a state with no legal
14
relationship to the United Kingdom.

The Constitution of 1937, still in force today, reflects two

unique aspects of Ireland's political evolution.' 5

The Catholic

nationalism that marked the Irish drive to independence' 6 and
the British-derived concept that the state's ability to infringe

upon the citizens' rights should be limited both flavor this
document. 17 The elevation of the Catholic religion is evident in
the rhetoric of the constitution's Preamble and in the spirit of
several of the Articles on Fundamental Rights, specifically the
provisions addressing education and the family.18 In fact, prior

12. D. GEORGE BOYCE, NATIONALISM INIRELAND 29 (2d ed. 1991). "Conquered"
is perhaps too strong a term, for many of the Irish ruling class actually welcomed
the English. Id.
13. For a historical overview of British rule in Ireland, see Id.
14. DAVID GWYNN MORGAN, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF IRELAND 23-24 (2d ed.
1990). Serious agitation for independent home rule began during the 19th
century. Jay A. Sigler, Constitutional Chronology to 1982, in 8 CONSTITUTIONS OF
THE COUNTRIES OF THE WORLD (IRELAND) 1, 5 (Albert P. Blaustein & Gilbert H. Flanz
eds., 1988). After years of British parliamentary intransigence over various Home
Rz.I. Aills, and in the wake of growing Irish militancy, an independent Ddll tireann
(Assembly of Ireland) was formed in 1918. MORGAN, supra, at 21. The following
year, this body proclaimed the Irish Free State and promulgated the first Irish
Constitution. Id. at 21-22. However, even with the establishment of a legislature
and the publication of a constitution, Ireland technically remained bound to the
United Kingdom until passage of The Republic of Ireland Act in 1948. Id. at 2324.
15. BASIL CHUBB, THE POLITICS OF THE IRISH CONSTITUTION 4-13, 33-44 (1991).
16. Gerard Hogan, Constitutional Analysis, In 8 CONSTITUTIONS OF THE
COUNTRIES OF THE WORLD (IRELAND). supra note 14. at 15, 17. Religious differences
severely hindered attempts to integrate Ireland into the British state, and after
several years Catholicism became hopelessly intertwined with Irish national self-

Identity. For an in-depth analysis of the interlocking nature of religious and
national identity in Ireland, see SEAN CRONIN, IRISH NATIONALISM (1981); JOHN
FULTON, THE TRAGEDY OF BELIEF (1991).
17. CHUBB, supra note 15, at 26. Personal rights derived from the British
liberal tradition and incorporated into the Irish Constitution include freedom of
religion, freedom of association, habeas corpus, and privacy in the home. Id.
18. Paul W. Butler & David L. Gregory, A Not So Distant Mirror: Federalism
and the Role of Natural Law in the United States, the Republic of Ireland. and the
European Community, 25 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 429, 446 (1992). The authors
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to its repeal in 1972, Article 44.1.2 explicitly recognized the
special position of the Catholic Church in Ireland's social fabric. 19
The Irish Constitution also evinces British liberalism and its
concern with individual liberty.20 For example, Article 40.3
provides that the state shall respect and, as far as possible, defend the personal and property rights of its citizens. 2 1 Moreover,
the Irish Constitution's Articles on Fundamental Rights
guarantee personal rights such as freedom of speech, 2 2 freedom
25
24
of religion, 23 inviolability of the home, and habeas corpus.
B. JudicialReview in the IrishJudicial System
The Irish Constitution also enunciates the role to be played
by the judicial branch in the overall governmental structure.

Article 34 provides that justice shall be administered in courts
established by the Irish Parliament. 2 6 This Article also specifies
that the High Court 2 7 and the Irish Supreme Court shall have

note, "The structure and language of the Constitution reveal a comparatively welldefined collective conscience seeking justice through the prism of Catholic
morality." Id.
19. IR. CoNsT. art. 44.1.2 (repealed 1972), quoted In Butler & Gregory, supra
note 18, at 450.
20. See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
21. Prior to the passage of the Eighth Amendment in 1983, Article 40.3 read:
1.

The State guarantees in its laws to respect, and, as far as
practicable, by its laws to defend and vindicate the personal
rights of the citizen.

2.

The State shall, in particular, by its laws protect as best it may
from unjust attack and, in the case of injustice done, vindicate
the life, person, good name and property rights of every citizen.

IR. CONST. art. 40.3.1-2, reprinted In 8 CONSTITUTIONS OF THE COUNTRIES OF THE
WORLD (IRELAND), supra note 14, at 66.
22. Id. art. 40.6.1, at 66-67.
23. Id. art. 44.2, at 71-72.
24. Id. art. 40.5, at 67.
25. Id. art. 40.4, at 67.
26. Id. art. 34, at 60-62.
27. The Irish High Court is equivalent in many respects to the United States
Circuit Courts of Appeals. The Irish High Court is endowed by the constitution
with original jurisdiction to determine all matters civil or criminal, including
constitutional questions. Id. art. 34.3.1-2, at 60-61. The High Court is at the
judicial level immediately below the Supreme Court, which enjoys appellate
jurisdiction over all decisions of the High Court. Id. art. 34.4.3, at 61. High Court
judges are appointed for life tenure by the executive branch. Id. art. 35.1-4, at 63.
Cf. U.S. CONST. art. III.
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VANDERBILT JOURNAL OFTRANSNATIONAL LAW

[Vol26:1117

Jurisdiction over the constitutionality of any law,28 bestowing
upon these courts the power of judicial review. 29
The
constitution's guarantee of judicial independence buttresses this
power.30 By providing for independent judicial review, the Irish
Constitution entrusts the ultimate function of interpretation of its
content to the courts. 31 The Irish courts have grown more
confident and active in
the exercise of judicial review during the
32
last quarter century.
III. THE IRISH SUBSTANTIVE RIGHTS MODEL: CONTENT AND
DEVELOPMENT

In exercising Judicial review, the Irish judiciary often has
been forced to grapple with and attempt to harmonize the
differing interests of the Catholic bias and the desire to protect
individual liberty manifest in the Irish Constitution.33 When
reconciliation has proven impossible, the Irish judiciary has been
forced to choose between the two influences.3 4 In modem times,
the 'concern for protecting individual liberty has come to
dominate Irish Jurisprudence, but religious values nevertheless
remain an important part of courts' considerations.3 5
The
evolution of Irish Jurisprudence regarding fundamental rights
protected by Articles 40 through 44 reflects the clash of
competing values and an activist approach by the judiciary in

28. IR. CONST. art. 34, reprinted In 8 CONSTITUTIONS OF THE COUNTRIES OF THE
WORLD (IRELAND), supra note 14, at 60-62.
29. Under the doctrine ofJudicial review developed by the Irish courts, "[i]t is
emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to [slay what the
law Is." This language, taken from Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137.
177 (1803), is particularly appropriate in light of the similarities between the
exercise of judicial review by the Irish courts and the United States Supreme
Court. PAUL C. BARTHOLOMEW, THE IRISH JUDICIARY 18 (1971).
30. Article 35.2 of the Irish Constitution provides that "[alll judges shall be
independent in the exercise of their judicial functions and subject only to this
Constitution and the law." IR. CONsT. art. 35.2, reprinted In 8 CONSTITUTIONS OF
THE COUNTRIES OF THE WORLD (IRELAND), supra note 14, at 63.
31. Creating a political system and environment in which judicial review
could flourish is considered one of the Irish Constitution's great achievements.
Hogan, supra note 16, at 18.
32. Francis William O'Brien, JudicialRevIew In Ireland, 9 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L.

REv. 587, 588-89 (1990).
33.
34.
35.

See Butler & Gregory, supra note 18, at 432.
Id. at 452.
Id. at 455-58.

19941

1125

IRISH ABORTION DEBATE

defining the scope of constitutional guarantees. 36 Beginning in
1963 with Ryan v. Attorney General,3 7 the High and Supreme

Courts embarked on an examination of the unenumerated rights
protected under the constitution. In Ryan and its progeny, the
Irish judiciary laid the foundations for the reasoning that later
marked its decisions relating to abortion, reasoning focused on
the substantive content of the protections of the Irish
Constitution.
A. Ryan v. Attorney General
The Irish judiciary's activist approach to protecting individual
liberties originated in a challenge of a fluoridation law by a
plaintiff claiming that the addition of fluoride to the public water
supply infringed on her constitutionally guaranteed personal
rights.3 8 The resolution of the matter hinged on whether Article
40.3's guarantee of state protection of the "personal rights of the

36. IR. CONST. arts. 40-44, reprinted In 8 CONSTITUTIONS OF THE COUNTRIES OF
THE WORLD (IRELAND), supra note 14, at 65-72. Briefly summarized, the provisions
of Articles 40-44 provide:
1.

Article 40: "All citizens shall, as human persons, be held equal
before the law." This Article goes on to delineate personal
freedoms on which the State may not encroach, including free
expression, free association, and privacy In the home.

2.

Article 41: This Article recognizes a special role for the family
and extends protection to the family unit.

3.

Article 42: This Article recognizes freedoms associated with
education.

4.

Article 43: "The State acknowledges that man, in virtue of his
natural being, has the natural right, antecedent to positive law,
to the private ownership of goods." This Article accordingly
furnishes protection to property rights.

5.

Article 44: This Article guarantees freedom of religion and
separation between church and state.

Id.
37. 1965 I.R. 294, available In LEXIS, Ireland Library (All Irish materials
cited throughout this Note are available in LEXIS, Ireland Library).
38. Id. at 308. The plaintiff challenged the Health (Fluoridation of Water) Act
of 1960 on two constitutional grounds. Her central argument rested on the claim
that the Act violated Article 40.3's guarantee to respect, defend, and vindicate the
citizens' personal rights. Id. at 308. This argument was the focus for both the
High Court's and the Supreme Court's opinions.

The plaintiff also claimed that

the Act violated the inalienable and imprescriptible rights guaranteed to the family
by Article 41 of the constitution. Id. This second argument is not discussed in
this Note. For the Supreme Court's discussion of this claim, see Id. at 349-50.
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40
citizen"3 9 extended to rights not specified in the constitution.
First, the High Court held that it had a duty to determine which
personal rights are protected by the constitution. 4 1 Further, the
High Court found, and the Supreme Court affirmed, that Article

40.3's general guarantee extended to unenumerated personal
rights. 42 Writing for the High Court, Justice Kenny defined the
contours of these unenumerated rights by reasoning that they
followed both from the Christian nature of the state and from
Catholic doctrine. 4 3 Ryan's more lasting significance, however,
rests in the judiciary's interpretive expansion of the substantive
protections afforded by the constitution to include rights not
specifically enumerated. 4 4
B. McGee v. Attorney General
The Ryan decision provoked an explosion of litigation
concerning the Articles on Fundamental Rights, 45 including the
case of McGee v. Attorney General,4 6 decided in 1974, which centered on issues of privacy and personal integrity. In McGee, a
woman with four children warned by her doctor of life-threatening risks presented by any subsequent pregnancy decided to
use contraception. 4 7
When she attempted to import
contraceptive jelly into Ireland, customs agents seized the jelly,
deeming its importation prohibited by Irish law.48 The woman
49
sued, arguing that the relevant law violated the constitution.

39.

IR.CONST. art. 40.3, reprintedIn 8 CONSTITUTIONS OF THE COUNTRIES OF THE

WORLD (IRELAND), supra note 14, at 66.

40.
41.
42.
integrity

Ryan, 1965 I.R. at 313.
Id.
Id. Justice Kennys opinion for the High Court deemed the right to bodily
to be one of the unenumerated personal rights protected by Article 40.3.

Id. at 313. The Supreme Court, however, considered this question unnecessary to
the resolution of the case. Id. at 345.
43. Id. at 313-14. Justice Kenny drew support for the proposition that a
right to bodily integrity exists from a 1962 Encyclical Letter of Pope John XXIII.

Id.
44. CHUBB, supranote 15, at 65.
45.

3 MODERN LEGAL SYSTEMS CYCLOPEDIA 3.150.19, § 1.2(D)(1) (Kenneth R.

Redden ed., 1990).
46.
47.
48.

1974 I.R. 284.
Id. at 289.
Id. at 290. The contraceptive Jelly was seized pursuant to Section 17 of

the Criminal Law Amendment Act of 1935, which provided in relevant part:
(1)
It shall not be lawful for any person to sell, or expose, offer,
advertise, or keep for sale or to import or attempt to import into
Saorstdt Itireann [Ireland] for sale, any contraceptive.
(2)

Any person who acts in contravention of the foregoing sub-

section of this section shall be guilty of an offence [sic under this

19941
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In finding for the plaintiff, the Supreme Court continued to
explore the scope of unenumerated substantive personal rights
protected by the Irish Constitution.5" By a four to one majority,
the Supreme Court held that the constitution protected an unenumerated right to marital privacy. 5 ' The court struck down the
restriction preventing the import of contraceptives as inconsistent
52
with this constitutionally guaranteed right.
The decision in McGee continued the Irish judicial activist
trend in defining the scope of the unenumerated rights protected
by the constitution and striking down laws that the courts
deemed to violate those rights.5 3 In McGee, Justice Walsh
explicitly instructed that judges have the duty to interpret the

constitution and to determine the scope of unenumerated
rights.5 4 According to this influential vision of judicial activism,

section and shall be liable on summary conviction thereof to a fine
not exceeding fifty pounds or, at the discretion of the court, to
imprisonment for any term not exceeding six months or to both such
fine and such imprisonment and, in any case to forfeiture of any
contraceptive in respect of which such offence [sic] was committed.
Quoted In McGee, 1974 I.R. at 285-86.
49. The plaintiff argued that Section 17 of the Criminal Law Amendment Act
violated Articles 40 (protection of personal rights). 41 (protection of the family), 42
(protection of parental rights), 44 (freedom of religion), 45 (protection of the social
order), and 50 (validity of preconstitutional laws) of the Irish Constitution. Id. at
286-88.
50. See CHUBB, supra note 15, at 52-53.
51. McGee, 1974 I.R. at 284-85.
52. Id. The Irish Supreme Court found that the Act violated Articles 40.1
and 40.3 of the constitution. Id. See supra note 21 for the text of Article 40.3.
Article 40.1 reads: "All citizens shall, as human persons, be held equal before the
law. This shall not be held to mean that the State shall not in its enactments
have due regard to differences of capacity, physical and moral, and of social
function. " IR. CONST. art. 40.1. reprintedIn 8 CONSTITUTION OF THE COUNTRIES OF
THE WORLD (IRELAND), supra note 14, at 65.
53. MORGAN, supra note 14, at 18-20. Morgan criticizes this judicial activism
as blurring the constitutional lines separating the different branches of the Irish
government. He notes that courts lack the information available to the legislative
branch. Id.
54. Justice Walsh wrote:
In this country it falls finally upon the judges to interpret the Constitution
and in doing so to determine, where necessary, the rights which are
superior or antecedent to positive law or which are imprescriptible or
inalienable. In the performance of this difficult duty there are certain
guidelines laid down in the Constitution for the judge. The very structure
and content of the Articles dealing with fundamental rights clearly indicate
that justice is not subordinate to the law... The judges must, therefore,
as best they can from their training and their experience interpret these
rights in accordance with their ideas of prudence, justice and charity. It is
but natural that from time to time the prevailing ideas of these virtues may
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the constitutional status of unenumerated rights was to be
determined by a substantive textual inquiry, sensitive to the
55
prevailing concepts of the times.
The judicial activist philosophy expressed in McGee may have
been inspired in part by the inertia of the Irish Parliament. 6 The
conservative nature of Irish politics often has translated into
parliamentary hesitancy to change laws to meet the needs of
contemporary society. 5 7 Junior members of Parliament attempted
to introduce bills relaxing contraceptive regulation, but the party
58
leadership and the Catholic Church quashed these proposals.

Judicial activism in the face of legislative footdragging remains
characteristic of current Irish lawmaking. 5 9
The numerous citations in McGee to United States Supreme
Court precedents exploring substantive rights affirmed the Irish
Supreme Court's shift to a substantive, content-based approach
to evaluating unenumerated rights.6 0 Three of the Irish justices
found the United States Supreme Court's conclusion that the
United States Constitution's substantive content included an
61
unspecified right to privacy highly relevant to the McGee case.
The references by the Irish court to United States cases
highlighted the parallel nature of the evolution of the Irish and
United States substantive rights approaches to protecting
personal privacy and autonomy, particularly in the area of pro62
creation.
McGee also marked a turning point in the Irish Supreme
Court's consideration of the religious values informing the consti-

be conditioned by the passage of time; no interpretation of the Constitution
is intended to be final for all time. It is given in the light of prevailing ideas
and concepts.
McGee. 1974 I.R. at 3 18-19.
55. Id.
56. MORGAN, supra note 14, at 20.
57. Id.
58. CHUBB, supra note 15, at 52. The perceived liberal slant in the evolution
of Irish Jurisprudence regarding fundamental rights alarmed the Irish Catholic
Church. Id.
59. See Infra part IV.C.2.a.

60. See generally John A. Quinlan, Note, The Right to Life of the Unborn-An
Assessment of the Eighth Amendment to the Irish Constitution, B.Y.U. L. REV. 371,
379-81 (1984) (examining the reaction in Ireland to McGee. the agitation for some
form of constitutional protection for fetuses, and the eventual passage of the

Eighth Amendment).
61. Justices Walsh, Henchey, and Griffin all cited to United States Supreme
Court opinions regarding the existence of unenumerated fundamental privacy
rights, specifically: Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497 (1961); Griswold v. Connecticut,
381 U.S. 479 (1965); and Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972). McGee, 1974
I.R. at 319, 327-28, 334-35.
62. See generally Butler & Gregory, supra note 18, at 452-63.
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tution's unenumerated protections. Justice Walsh in McGee
expressed a preference for generic Christian values over more
specific Catholic teachings, 6 3 a view consistent with the recent
repeal of the constitutional provision recognizing the special
position of the Catholic Church." Justice Walsh noted that the
constitution, while labeling Ireland a religious state, nevertheless
acknowledged the pluralistic nature of Irish society. 65 Equating
the natural law that undergirded
the
constitution's
unenumerated rights with the law of God, Justice Walsh in his
concurrence instructed that the Christian principles of prudence,
justice, and charity should inform the judiciary's efforts to define
the scope of unenumerated rights. 6 6 The generically Christian
values evinced in McGee thus contrasted with the more overtly
67
Catholic references in Ryan.
C. The 1983 Amendment: Reaction to McGee
The potential implications of an expansive application of the
substantive rights jurisprudential model and the Irish Supreme
Court's attention to the evolution of United States constitutional
doctrine 6 8 intimated to many that the Irish Supreme Court might
extend the guarantee of constitutional privacy to abortion. 6 9 In
1981, to preempt any efforts to legalize abortion in Ireland,
conservatives launched a campaign for a constitutional

amendment to safeguard the interests of fetuses.70

After

protracted debate over the wording, Irish voters in 1983 approved
an amendment extending protection to the right to life of the
unborn. 71

The resultant Eighth Amendment (Article 40.3.3)

reads, 'The State acknowledges the right to life of the unborn
and, with due regard to the equal right to life of the mother,
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
note 43
68.

McGee, 1974 I.R. at 317-18.
See supranote 19 and accompanying text.
McGee, 1974 I.R. at 317.
Id. at 317-19. See also supra note 54 and accompanying text.
See Ryan v. Attorney General, 1965 I.R. 294, at 313-14. See also supra
and accompanying text.
In State (Quinn) v. Ryan, 1965 I.R. 70, Justice Walsh noted:

In this state one would have expected that if the approach of any Court of
final appeal of another State was to have been held up as an example for
this Court to follow it would more appropriately have been the Supreme
Court of the United States rather than the [British House of Lords.
Id. at 126.
69. Quinlan, supranote 60, at 378-80.
70. Id. at 383-84.
71. Id. at 387-390. The Eighth Amendment was passed by a vote of 841,233
to 416.136. Sigler, supra note 14, at 11.
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guarantees in its laws to respect, and, as far as practicable, by its
laws to defend and vindicate that right."7 2
With its emphasis on the personal rights guaranteed to both
the fetus and the woman, Article 40.3.3 carried forward the Irish
Supreme Court's substantive rights approach to privacy issues.7 3
In seeking to delineate whose rights and which rights the constitution protects, the amendment echoed the court's contentfocused jurisprudential model.7 4 In passing the Eighth Amendment, the Irish public responded along the substantive rights
lines laid down by the Irish Courts and provided the judiciary
with additional guidelines as to which protections the
75
constitution should include.

IV. THE IRISH SUBSTANTIVE RIGHTS MODEL AND ABORTION

Article 40.3.3 provided the Irish judiciary with specific
constitutional instructions regarding the substantive rights of the
woman and the fetus. The Amendment declared that the right to
life of the mother and fetus were equal, but failed to provide any
indication of how to balance these competing interests. 7 6 Moreover, the Irish Parliament subsequently provided no legislative
guidance regarding how the state planned to safeguard these
rights. 77 Although abortion on demand would continue to be
illegal in Ireland, 78 the issues of women travelling to the United

72. IR. CONST. art. 40.3.3, reprinted In 8 CONSTITUTIONS OF THE COUNTRIES OF
THE WORLD (IRELAND). supra note 14, at 66.
73. MORGAN, supra note 14, at 15-16; CHUBB, supra note 15, at 52-55.
74. Quinlan, supra note 60, at 396.
75. See generally id. at 378-91. These guidelines have been criticized as
overly vague. Id. at 396-97.
76. Id.
77. See Attorney General v. Open Door Counselling, 1988 I.R. 593.
78. At least Chief Justice O'Higgins held this view in 1983, shortly after
passage of the Eighth Amendment.
A right to privacy or, as it has been put, a right "to be let alone" can never
be absolute. There are many acts done in private which the State is
entitled to condemn, whether such be done by an individual on his own or
with another. The law has always condemned abortion, incest, suicide
attempts, suicide pacts, euthanasia or mercy killing. These are prohibited
simply because they are morally wrong ....
Norris v. Attorney General, 1984 I.R. 36, 64.
Others, such as Irish Attorney General Peter D. Sutherland, were not as
certain as to the extent of the protections afforded by the amendment:
[The] wording [of the Amendment] is ambiguous and unsatisfactory. It will
lead inevitably to confusion and uncertainty, not merely amongst the
medical profession ... but also amongst lawyers and more specifically the
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Kingdom to have abortions and the availability of abortion In
cases of medical emergency remained unresolved by the
Amendment.
Frustrated by the lack of parliamentary

instruction

9

and propelled by a now established tradition of

activism, the Irish judiciary took upon itself to determine how the
issues of travelling abroad and medical emergency were affected
by the constitutional guarantees.8 0
Two salient characteristics marked the judiciary's consideration of these issues. First, for several years the Irish courts
avoided directly balancing the right to life interests of the woman
against those of the fetus.8 1 The judiciary retreated somewhat
from its earlier activism by choosing to characterize the issues
before them narrowly. 8 2
Second, the courts began to
acknowledge that the issue of women wishing to travel abroad for
an abortion implicated European Community law.8 3
This
acknowledgment laid the foundation for the subsequent
consideration of these issues by the ECJ and its development of
84
the affecting commerce model in the context of abortion.
A. Attorney General v. Open Door Counselling
Attorney General v. Open Door Counselling8" presented the
first major opportunity for the Irish judiciary to address Article
40.3.3's effect on the substantive rights protected by the Irish
Constitution.8" In this case the Irish courts examined whether

judges who will have to interpret It. Far from providing the protection and
certainty which is sought by many of those who have advocated its
adoption, it will have a contrary effect.
Statement of Attorney General Peter D. Sutherland, SEN. DEB. 520 (daffy ed. May

4, 1983), quoted In IR. TIMES, Feb. 16, 1983.
79.

See Infra notes 145-46 and accompanying text.

80. See Infra parts IV.A. & C.
81. See Infra parts IV.A.-B.
82. For instance, both the High Court and Supreme Court In Attorney
General v. Open Door Counselling, 1988 I.R. 593, refused to address the broader
question of how to balance the competing rights of women and fetuses, though the
facts of the case might have allowed them to do so. See Infra part IV.A.
83. See Infra parts lV.A.-B.
84. See Infra parts W.B.
85. This case was heard before the High Court in 1986, 1988 I.R. 593, and
the Supreme Court in 1988, 1988 I.R. 619.
86. The plaintiff in the case sued for an injunction to prohibit several
counselling centers from providing information to women about the availability of
abortion services outside of Ireland. 1988 I.R. 593, at *11. Originally the plaintiff
in the case, an anti-abortion group known as the Society for the Protection of the
Unborn Child (SPUC), attempted to assert Article 40.3.3 against two private
pregnancy advice clinics in Dublin. Id. at * 11.
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the activities of several counselling centers, which had advised
and aided Irish women in obtaining abortions abroad, contravened the fetus' right to life as explicitly protected by Article

40.3.3.87 The High Court and, in turn, the Supreme Court found
that the counselling activities violated Article 40.3.3.88 Both
courts focused narrowly on how the woman's right of access to
Information weighed against the fetus' interests and refused to
address the broader issue of how to balance their competing
89
rights to life.
1.

The High Court's Opinion

In Open Door Counselling, the plaintiffs argued that the
counselling activities violated both the statutory criminal law, as
codified in the 1861 Offences [sic] Against the Persons Act (1861
Act), and Article 40.3.3 of the constitution. 90 The defendant
counselling services asserted, however, that their assistance to
women seeking abortions was legal because the extraterritorial
activities of the pregnant women did not constitute crimes in the
Jurisdictions where the abortions occurred.9 1 They maintained
that to find their activities unlawful under the 1861 Act would
extend Ireland's criminal law to actions occurring in jurisdictions
where such acts were legal. 92 Defendants contended that only
the legislature, not the courts, could effect this jurisdictional
extension. 9 3 The counselling services argued additionally that
the constitutional rights to privacy, to freedom of expression and
communication, and to freedom of access to information
94
protected their activities.
The High Court rejected all of the defendants' arguments. 95
It deemed the constitutional guarantees asserted by the
defendants to be qualified rights that did not override the
"fundamental right to life of the unborn." 96 By this reasoning,

87. Open DoorCounselling, 1988 I.R. 593, 1988 I.R. 619.
88. Open DoorCounselling, 1988 I.R. 593, at *25-26; 1988 I.R. 619, at *8.
89. Open DoorCounselling, 1988 I.R. 593, at *25,1988 I.R. 619, at *4.
90. Open Door Counselling, 1988 I.R. 593, at *1. Article 58 of the 1861 Act
made It criminal to give or receive an abortion. Article 59, directed at aiding and
abetting, criminalized the knowing supply or procurement of materials used to
cause abortion. Offences (sic] Against the Person Act, 1861, 24 & 25 Vict., ch.
100 9§ 58-59. Although this Act was passed by the English Parliament, its
coverage extended specifically to Ireland. Id. pmbl.; M.J. Findlay, CriminalLiability
for Complicity In Abortions Committed OutsideIreland, 1980 IR. JURIST 88, 88.
91. Open DoorCounselling, 1988 I.R. 593, at '19.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Id. at "14.
95. Id. at "1-2.
96. Id. at 023.

1994]

IRISH ABORTION DEBATE

1133

the substantive protections afforded to the fetus ranked superior
to the mother's right of access to information. 9 7 Moreover, the
High Court held that, while the judiciary ordinarily should not
extend the territorial reach of the criminal law, the court might
have a constitutional obligation to do so when a breach of a
fundamental right occurred in order to defend and vndicate that
right.98 The High Court reasoned that, even if the abortion were
legal in the jurisdiction where performed, the counselling services
nevertheless could be prosecuted criminally for corrupting public
morals. 99 The High Court left unresolved the question of the
jurisdictional reach of and the type of activities forbidden by
Article 40.3.3.
The counselling services also contended that an injunction
would violate the right of access to services secured under the
I °°
EEC Treaty and subsequent European Community directives.
The High Court rejected this argument, holding that the
injunction issued was directed at assisting a woman to have an

abortion and therefore did not prevent a pregnant woman from
becoming aware of the availability of abortion services located
outside Ireland.' 0 ' Although the European Community law claim
failed in this case,2 this argument would be put forth successfully
0
in future cases.'
2.

The Supreme Court's Opinion

On appeal, the Irish Supreme Court upheld the ruling of the
High Court.' 0 3 Like the High Court, the Supreme Court focused
on the narrow inquiry of whether the activities of the counselling
services impinged upon the fetus' substantive right to life.' 0 4 The
97. See Id.
98. Id. at* 19.
99. Id. at *22. The High Court ruled that a jury should decide the question
of intent to corrupt public morals. Id. at *21. By reasoning that the defendants
could be prosecuted for corrupting public morals instead of conspiracy, the High
Court avoided having to hear the prosecution of the defendants for the inchoate
offense of conspiracy to help a woman obtain an abortion when the substantive
"crime," abortion, was not a criminal act in the jurisdiction where the activity took
place. See Findlay, supra note 90, at 96-97.

100. Open Door Counselling, 1988 I.R. 593, at *27.
101. Id.

102. See Infra part lV.B.
103. Open Door Counselling, 1988 I.R. 619.
104. The Supreme Court framed the question as follows:
The essential issue in this case, having regard to the nature of the
guarantees contained in Article 40.3.3... of the Constitution is the Issue
as to whether the defendants' admitted activities were assisting pregnant
women within that jurisdiction to travel outside that jurisdiction in order
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Supreme Court noted that the defendants had not argued that
their services were directed at preserving the right to life of the
woman, and thus this right did not have to be balanced against
the fetus' competing interests.10 5 The Supreme Court therefore
deemed the simple question to be answered; the defendants'
106
activities resulted in the destruction of the life of the fetus.
The court found that the unenumerated right to information
rated lower in the hierarchy of constitutional protections than the
right to life of the fetus. 10 7 The Supreme Court did not address
Article 40.3.3's territorial reach or the availability of criminal
sanctions as an enforcement vehicle. It looked only to the
defendants' infringement upon the fetus' interests, not to how the
laws of other states might circumscribe the reach of the Irish
Constitution. 108
The Supreme Court agreed with the High Court that Open
Door Counselling did not implicate the EEC Treaty's provisions on
freedom of access to services.1 0 9 The Supreme Court characterized the access issue in terms of the defendants' ability to provide
information about services, a right unprotected by European
Community law, not the ability to obtain information about
services, a right protected by European Community law.1 0°
Although the court denied that European Community law applied
to Open Door Counselling, it nevertheless opened the way for
future European Community challenges by women wishing to
obtain information about abortion services outside of Ireland.
to have an abortion. To put the matter in another way, the issue and the
question of fact to be determined Is: were they thus assisting in the
destruction of the life of the unborn?
Id. at "6.
105. See Id. The court thus was able to delay addressing this crucial
question.
106. Id.
107. Id. at *7. The Supreme Court was confident that no right to information
could arise to defeat the constitutional right to life of the child, particularly when
the purpose of the information was to defeat the right to life. Id. In making such
a broad statement, the court neglected to consider whether there could be a right
to information in cases in which the information was necessary to preserve the
constitutionally protected right to life of the woman.
108. See Open Door Counselling, 1988 I.R. 619.
109. Id. at *7-8. Articles 59 and 60 of the EEC Treaty address access to
services. EEC Treaty, supra note 4. arts. 59-60. Article 59 guarantees equality of
access to services located in different Member States; Article 60 defines "services,"
as "normally supplied for remuneration" and provides that i[slervices shall include
In particular: ... [alctivities of the .... professions." Id.
110. Open Door CounsellIng, 1988 I.R. 619, at *7-8. Under Article 29.4.3 of
the Irish Constitution, laws enacted by the Community or laws enacted by the
state pursuant to European Community obligations may not be invalidated by the
constitution. IR. CONST., art. 29.4.3. reprinted In 8 CONSTrTUTIONS OF THE
COUNTRIES OF THE WORLD (IRELAND), supra note 14, at 56.
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Because injunctions in Ireland apply beyond the actual parties to
anyone having notice of the order, the decision in Open Door
Counselling had the effect of preventing virtually anyone from
outside
providing information to women seeking abortions
112
likely.
was
therefore,
challenge,
future
A
Ireland."'
B. SPUC v. Grogan: Access to Services
Several Irish student organizations made this challenge in
the following year, thereby forcing the Irish judiciary to frame the
issue of travelling outside Ireland for an abortion as an economic
right to services.' 1 3 In defending a suit brought by the Society for
the Protection of Unborn Children (SPUC) to enforce Article
40.3.3, several student unions who had published information
about abortion services available in the United Kingdom argued
that Articles 59 and 60 of the EEC Treaty protected their right to
provide information about access to overseas abortion
procedures."x 4 Although Articles 59 and 60 nominally protect
only the right of freedom to receive information regarding
services, the High Court held that a corresponding protection for
the right to provide such information also must exist." 15 By
characterizing the right to give abortion information as a service
implicating the guarantees of European Community law, the High
Court was able to request an ECJ ruling on whether Open Door
Counselling's prohibitions violated the European Community
principle of nondiscriminatory transborder access to goods and

services. 116
The Supreme Court upheld the High Court's reference to the
ECJ even though it recognized the potential difficulties posed by
a decision that European Community law applied to the activities
of the student unions.1 1 7 Writing in concurrence, Justice Walsh

111.
112.
113.
114.

See Charleton, supra note 11, at 367.
See I&.
SPUC v. Grogan, 1 C.M.L.R. 689; 1989 I.R. 760.
Grogan, 1 C.M.L.R. 689, at *30-31. See supra note 109 for a summary of

the protections afforded by Articles 59 and 60.
115. Grogan, 1 C.M.L.R. 689, at *3. The High Court distinguished Grogan

from Open Door Counselling on the grounds that the latter case addressed the
question of the right to obtain information, whereas Grogan addressed the right to
give information. Id. at *3. The Supreme Court, however, rejected any distinction
between the activities at issue in Open Door Counselling and Grogan. Grogan,
1989 I.R. 760, at *6-7.
116. Grogan, 1 C.M.L.R. 689. The Irish court referred the matter to the ECJ
under Article 177 of the EEC Treaty, which provides for ECJ preliminary rulings
on Interpretation of Treaty provisions. EEC Treaty, supra note 4, art. 177.
117. Grogan, 1989 I.R. 760, at '7. Although the Supreme Court upheld the
reference, it disagreed with the High Court regarding the availability of an
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asserted that the European Community method of protecting

access to goods and services, in essence the affecting commerce
model, was circumscribed within Ireland by Article 40.3.3,
because the right to life of the fetus trumped the rights of the
woman to travel and to enjoy access to information. 118 He
deemed it the Supreme Court's duty in the aftermath of an ECJ
decision to determine how to reconcile European Community
economic rights with the Irish Constitution's substantive

guarantees. 119
C. Attorney General v. X:
BalancingDirectly Competing Interests
In early 1992, the case of Attorney General v. X 120 forced the
Irish judiciary to return to a consideration of what substantive
rights the constitution protects and under which circumstances.
The case, involving a fourteen year-old girl desiring an abortion,
at last necessitated a judicial balancing of the competing rights to
life of the woman and the fetus. The girl was raped by the father
of a close school friend and became pregnant. 12 1 After consulting
with her parents about various alternatives, the girl decided to go

to the United Kingdom to obtain an abortion. 12 2

Before the

procedure could be performed, however, the Irish High Court
granted an interlocutory injunction forbidding the abortion from

taking place. 1 23 Upon the girl's return to Ireland, an experienced
clinical psychologist examined her and determined that carrying
the fetus would result in considerable mental damage to the girl

and might even cause her to commit suicide. 124 In reconsidering
interlocutory injunction during the pendency of the action. Id. The High Court
had deferred deciding on SPUC's application for an interlocutory injunction until
the ECJ ruled on the case. Grogan, 1 C.M.L.R. 689, at *4. The Supreme Court,
however, granted the injunction, rejecting the contention that considering an
appeal involving the availability of an interlocutory injunction was in effect a
review of the High Court's reference of the matter to the ECJ. Grogan, 1989 I.R.
760, at *7.
118. Grogan, 1989 I.R. 760 at *9 (Walsh, J., concurring).
119. Id. at "10.
120. 1992 I.R. 1.
121. Id.
122. Id. at *3. The girl and her parents traveled to the United Kingdom
together and made the necessary arrangements. Id.
123. Id. at *3-4. Ironically, the girl and her parents themselves first brought
the case to the attention of the authorities. Hoping to have the rapist prosecuted,
they inquired of the Garda Slochana (police) whether it would be possible to use
fetal tissue samples to confirm the identity of the biological father. Id. at *3. The
police then informed the Office of the Director of Public Prosecutions, who in turn
informed the Attorney General. Id. The Attorney General then filed with the High
Court for an injunction to prevent the girl from obtaining an abortion. Id.
124. Id. at *13-14.
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the injunction, therefore, both the High Court and the Supreme
Court found themselves faced with two lives at stake: that of the
girl and that of the fetus.
1.

The High Court's Reasoning

Having boldly affirmed the judiciary's ability to adjudicate the
case in the absence of parlimentary guidance, 12 5 the High Court
turned to the substantive issues in question. The court held the
right to life of the fetus to be paramount under the particular
facts of the case. 12 6 It distinguished X from situations of medical
emergency for the woman on the grounds that X involved a more
uncertain, self-inflicted risk.1 27 Contending that the risk of
suicide was much less than the certainty of termination of the life
of the fetus by an abortion, the High Court ruled that the fetus'
12 8
interests had to be protected.
An assertion that preventing the girl from travelling
amounted to an unconstitutional infringement of her liberty
interests also failed to sway the High Court from upholding the
injunction. 1 29
The High Court reasoned that when a
constitutional right such as travel was abused to further a wrong,
as it deemed an abortion, then the court could restrain the
wrongful act even though doing so involved curtailing the exercise
0
of a constitutional right.13

125. Attorney General v. X, 1992 I.L.R.M. 401, at *5. The High Court asserted
its right to adjudicate the matter in strong language.
The Constitution acknowledges many rights which the courts are required
to protect and vindicate. There have been hundreds of cases in which they
have carried out this constitutional duty, even though no law has been
enacted by the Oireachtas [Parliament] regulating the manner in which it
Is to be done. The right acknowledged in the Eighth Amendment Is clear
and unambiguous and the court's duty to protect It is imperative.
Id.
126. Id. at *6.
127. Id. The High Court recognized that there was a risk to the girrs life, but
reasoned that her parents' love and support would help the girl to cope with the
difficulty of her situation. Id.
128. Id. The High Court failed to consider, however, that the girrs threatened
suicide also posed a real and imminent danger to the fetus's life.
129. See Id. at *6.
130. Id. at *6. In earlier cases, the Irish Supreme Court had held it to that It
violated Article 40.4 to deprive a person of his liberty on the belief that the person
would commit offenses if left free. Ryan v. Director of Public Prosecutions, 1989
I.L.R.M. 333; People v. O'Callaghan, 1966 I.R. 501. It was argued that a court
order prohibiting the girl to exercise her right to personal liberty by travelling to
the United Kingdom for an abortion would constitute the sort of action condemned
in Ryan and O'Callaghan. X, 1992 I.L.R.M. 401, at *6. The High Court found that
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The High Court rejected a similar argument based on the
girl's right to travel under the EEC Treaty.1 3 ' Although acknowledging the ECJ's characterization of abortion services as within
the ambit of Articles 59 and 60,132 the High Court refused to
apply European Community law.' 3 3 Deeming the passage of
Article 40.3.3 an "expression of public policy," the court exercised
the power, granted to Member States by a European Community
Council Directive, of derogation, which allows a Member State to
refuse to enforce European Community law "on grounds of public
policy, public security or public health."134 The High Court found
derogation to be especially appropriate because of the strong
moral convictions surrounding the issue. I3 5 This reasoning
insulated the issues of abortion in Ireland and women leaving the
state to obtain abortions from the application of European
Community law. '3 6
2.

The Supreme Court's Reasoning

Even though it used the same content-based approach for
examining the girl's and the fetus's competing rights, the Irish
Supreme Court reached a conclusion opposite of that reached by
the High Court.' 3 7 The Supreme Court found that the risk to the
girl's life outweighed the interests of the fetus and allowed the
abortion to proceed.' 3 8 In so doing, the court expanded on the
High Court's reasoning and confirmed the primacy of the substantive rights model in considering abortion issues. 1 39 Its
decision, while revoluntionary in allowing abortion to occur

Ryan and O'Calaghanwere distinguishable on the grounds that these cases were

decided in criminal proceedings in which the accuseds were imprisoned awaiting
trial and that these cases did not support the broader proposition that a court
could not restrain a party from committing an unlawful act by limiting her
constitutional right to liberty. Id.

131. X. 1992 I.L.R.M. 401, at *7-8.
132. Id. at *7. The High Court was referring to the recent ECJ decision in

SPUC v. Grogan, 3 C.M.L.R. 849 (1991), discussed Infra part V.B.

133. X, 1992 I.L.R.M. 401, at *9.
134. Id. at *8; Council Directive 73/148 EEC O.J. (L172) 14.
135. X. 1992 I.L.R.M. 401, at *8. The High Court noted that the Eighth
Amendment was an unequivocal expression of public will and public policy
regarding a moral issue. Id.
136. Chief Justice Finlay implicitly recognized this result in his opinion for the
Supreme Court in X. See Id. at *18.

137. Id. at*14.
138. Id.
139. Id. at "10-14.
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legally in Ireland, was merely evolutionary in the application of
0
Irish content-based jurisprudence. 14
a.

The Power of the Judiciary

The absence of legislation did not constrain the Supreme
Court's adjudication of the X case. In their pleadings, the girl
and her parents challenged the judiciary's power to implement
Article 40.3.3 without appropriate legislation to guide the courts
regarding how to weigh the competing interests of women and
fetuses. 14 1 The Supreme Court firmly rejected this argument.
Writing for the court, Chief Justice Finlay noted that the
constitution obligated each branch of the Irish government, including the judiciary, to guarantee, defend, and vindicate the
personal rights of the citizen. 14 2 To accomplish these ends,
Justice Finlay wrote, the judiciary's powers "are as ample as the
defence [sic] of the Constitution requires." 43 The rest of the
court shared this willingness to exercise judicial review to protect
personal rights. 144 The court's readiness to find itself capable of
adjudicating the X case without legislative guidance was

tempered, however, by Justice McCarthy's clear demand for
parliamentary action. 145 In his concurrence, he labeled the
the eight years since the
failure to enact appropriate legislation in
146
passage of Article 40.3.3 "inexcusable".

Chief Justice Finlay's extensive quotations from McGee v.
140. See Id.
Attorney General, 1974 I.R. 284, and other precedents slmilarly addressed to
See X, 1992
unenumerated constitutional rights supports this conclusion.
I.L.R.M. 401. at *11-12.
141. X, 1992 I.L.R.M. 401, at *4. They argued that the use of the term "laws"
in the Eighth Amendment, meant exclusively laws enacted by Parliament. Id. at
*8. As no laws regarding the enforcement of the Amendment had been passed, it
was asserted that the Irish Supreme Court had no jurisdiction to intervene. Id.

142. Id. at *10.
143. Id. (quoting The State (Quinn) v. Ryan, 1965 I.R. 70, 122).

144. Id. Justices McCarthy, O'Flaherty, and Egan were explicit in their views
that the Court could not be prevented from adjudicating the case because of a
want of legislative guidance. Id. at *34, 38, 42. This same view also was implicit
in the opinion of Justice Hederman, for he willingly decided the case on the
merits. See Id. at "19-20.
145. Id. at *35.
146. Id. Justice McCarthy wrote:
In the context of the eight years that have passed since the
amendment was adopted and the two years since Grogan's case, the failure
by the legislature to enact the appropriate legislation is no longer just
unfortunate; it is inexcusable. What are pregnant women to do? What are
the medical profession to do? They have no guidelines save what may be
gleaned from the judgments in this case. What additional considerations
are there? Is the victim of rape, statutory or otherwise, or the victim of
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Balancing the Competing Interests

Having confirmed its power to adjudicate matters falling
under Article 40.3.3, the Supreme Court next attempted to balance the substantive rights guaranteed by this constitutional
provision. This consideration, necessitated by the girl's threatened suicide, made the X case one of first impression for the
Supreme Court. Since the 1983 Amendment, the court had never
been forced to choose directly between the life of the woman and
the life of the fetus. 1 47 Like the High Court, the Supreme Court
deemed the two rights to be in counterbalancing tension with one
another. 148
Writing for the Supreme Court, Chief Justice Finlay hearkened back to McGee for instruction regarding how to strike the
proper balance between the woman's and the fetus's competing
rights.1 49 The court ruled that the concepts of "prudence, justice
and charity," interpreted in accordance With the prevailing ideas
of the time, should inform the court's examination of the
substantive content of the constitution.1 5 0 The court held that
applying these concepts in the modem era necessitated that the
court, in balancing the lives of the two parties, give great weight
to a living woman's place within her family and society. 5 1 To
152
that end, the court gave primacy to the woman's right to life.

incest, finding herself pregnant, to be assessed in a manner different from
others? The amendment, born of public disquiet, historically divisive of
our people, guaranteeing in its laws to respect and by its laws, to defend
the right to life of the unborn, remains bare of legislative direction.
Id.
147. X, 1992 I.R. 1.
148. See Id. at 12-13.

149. Id. at *11-12. Chief Justice Finlay clearly tied his reasoning in this
regard to the teachings of McGee v. Attorney General, 1974 I.R. 284:
Such a harmonious interpretation of the constitution carried out in
accordance with concepts of prudence, Justice and charity, as they have
been explained in the Judgment of Walsh, J. in McGee v. The Attorney
General leads me to the conclusion that in vindicating and defending as far
as practicable the right of the unborn to life but at the same time giving
due regard to the right of the mother to life, that the Court must, amongst
the matters to be so regarded, concern itself with the position of the
mother within a family group, with persons on whom she is dependent,
within other instances, persons who are dependent upon her and her
interaction with other citizens and members of the society in the areas in
which her activities occur.
X, 1992 I.R. 1, at *12.
150. Id. (quoting The State (Healy) v. Donoghue, 1976 I.A. 325, 347).
151. Id.; see supra note 149 and accompanying text.
152. SeeX. 1992 I.R. 1, at *12.
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It deemed the proper balancing test to be:
[f it is established as a matter of probability that there is a
real and substantial risk to the life as distinct from the
health of the mother, which can only be avoided by the
termination of her pregnancy, that such termination is
true interpretation of
permissible, having regard to the
153
Article 40.3.3 of the Constitution.
Applying this test, the court concluded that the girl's threatened

suicide constituted a "real and substantial risk" to her life which
only terminating the pregnancy could prevent. 154

Three of the remaining four justices endorsed Chief Justice
Finlay's "real and substantial risk" formulation and its application. 15 5 Justice Egan noted additionally that it did not matter
whether the risk to the woman was one of self-destruction rather
than some other life-threatening danger. 1 56 In his concurrence,
Justice McCarthy made explicit the implicit holding of X: the
court's finding that the girl could terminate her pregnancy led to
the inevitable conclusion that Article 40.3.3 contemplated lawful
The court's opinion,
abortions taking place in Ireland. x5 7
of a "real and
situations
to
those
abortions
legal
however, limited
15 8
On-demand
substantial risk" to the life of the woman.
procedures motivated by other reasons remained unlawful.1 5 9
Nevertheless, legal abortion was now possible in Ireland.

153. I&at 13.
154. Id. at *14. The court placed heavy weight on the report of a psychologist
who had concluded that the risk of the girl's committing suicide was very great.
I&. at *13-14. The Chief Justice reasoned that such a risk would be exceedingly
difficult both to monitor and to prevent. Id. at "14.
155. Justices McCarthy, Egan, and O'Flaherty agreed with both the test
formulated by Chief Justice Finlay and the result he reached. Id. at *33, 39, 43.
Justice Hederman approved of the "real and substantial risk" standard but
dissented from the ruling that the girl might obtain an abortion. Id. at *29-30. He
held that the mother's right of self-determination should not be given priority over
the protection of the right to life of the fetus. Id.
156. Id. at *43.

157. Id. at *34.
158. Id. at "14.
159. Though the Irish Supreme Court never explicitly stated that on demand
abortion remained unlawful, it is clear from an application of the "real and
substantial risk" standard that a woman's mere desire to have an abortion not
motivated by serious health concerns would not be sufficient to overcome the
interests of the fetus.
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Extraterritoriality and the Right to Travel

Although it recognized an unenumerated constitutional right
to travel, 160 the court held that this right was inferior to that of
the fetus's right to life. 16 1 In concluding that the woman's right
to travel could be qualified to protect the life of the fetus, the
court limited a woman's ability to leave Ireland legally to obtain
an abortion. 16 2 The Supreme Court held that it was valid to
restrain a woman from travelling from the jurisdiction when the
exercise of the right to travel conflicted with the interests of the

fetus. 163 It found arguments that orders restricting travel would
be impossible to supervise or enforce unpersuasive, reasoning
that such expectations did not relieve the judiciary of its
obligation to defend and vindicate personal rights. 164
Two justices, McCarthy and O'Flaherty, dissented from the
majority on the issue of travel and held that a woman's right to
travel could not be curtailed. 16 5 Their view more consistently
reflected Irish judicial precedent. In Open Door Counselling, the
Supreme Court had found that giving pregnant women information about abortion services outside Ireland violated Article
40.3.3, but had not addressed limiting a woman's right to
travel. 166 Justices McCarthy and O'Flaherty refused to extend
the information ban of Open Door Counselling to travel. 16 7 By
contrast, the majority's restriction of the right to travel essentially

160. Writing for the High Court in 1979, then Justice Finlay recognized an
unenumerated right to travel protected by Article 40 of the constitution in The
State (M) v. The Attorney General, 1979 I.R. 73, 80-81. Writing for the Irish
Supreme Court in X, now Chief Justice Finlay again held that Article 40 embraced
an unenumerated right to travel. X, 1992 I.R. 1, at "15.
161. X, 1992 I.R. 1, at '16.
162. Id.
163. Id. Although recognizing that whenever possible the judiciary should
seek to harmonize interrelated constitutional rights. Chief Justice Finlay noted
that, when such harmonization proved impossible, the judiciary necessarily was
forced to prioritize rights. Id. at "15.
164. Id. at *17.
165. Id. at *37, 40. According to Justice McCarthy. the right to life of the
fetus and woman's right to travel were neither interrelated nor to be balanced

against one another. Id at *37. He held that a woman's right to travel could not
be curtailed on the basis of any sort of an intent on the part of the woman. Id.
Tracking Professor Findlay's argument, see Findlay, supra note 90, at 92-95,
Justice McCarthy reasoned that a "conspiracy" to travel to another state to
commit a lawful act in that state could not permit a restraining order. X, 1992
I.R. 1, at *11. Going a step beyond Findlay, McCarthy postulated that even if a
woman intended to travel to another state to commit an act unlawful in Ireland,
such as exploding a bomb, she could not lawfully be prevented from exercising her
right to travel. Id.
166. Attorney General v. Open Door Counselling, 1988 I.R. 619.
167. X, 1992 I.R. 1, at *37, 40.
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broadened the scope of conduct prohibited by Article 40.3.3 to
include abortions performed outside Ireland, for the only way a
woman could obtain an abortion abroad was by exercising her
right to travel.
d.

Applicability of European Community Law

The Supreme Court in X grounded its reasoning exclusively
in Irish constitutional law, placing no reliance upon European
Community legal principles. 16 8 Chief Justice Finlay reasoned
conclusorily that because no Community legal issue had been
raised, neither an application of European Community law nor a
reference to the ECJ was necessary. 16 9 This conclusion was
questionable because the court itself characterized the issues
raised on appeal. 170 It as easily could have found that X
implicated Articles 59 and 60 of the EEC Treaty and then referred
the case to the ECJ. 17 The court's characterization of the issues
as concerning only Irish constitutional doctrine indicated little
about the relevancy of European Community law, instead
revealing the Irish judiciary's overriding concern with defining
domestic constitutional rights.

V. THE ECJ AND THE AFFECTING COMMERCE MODEL

Although the Irish Supreme Court denied the relevance of
European Community law to the X case, the applicability of
European Community law in the context of abortion services
already had been considered by the ECJ. In 1991 the ECJ
applied European Community law to the issue of a woman's
access to abortion services in SPUC v. Grogan,17 2 the case
referred to it by the Irish High Court. Although the Grogan
opinion had little immediate impact on the Irish abortion

168. Id. at *18-19.
169. Id. at *19. Chief Justice Finlay also took the practical position that, by
the time a reference reached the ECJ, the matter would be moot. Id. He was the
only member of the court to discuss European Community law as it applied to the
X case. Id.
170. Id.
171. This is especially true when examined in light of the ruling in Case C159/90, SPUC v. Grogan, 3 C.M.L.R.' 849 (1991), discussed Infra part V.B., in

which the ECJ deemed abortion a "service" for European Community law
purposes.
172. 3 C.M.L.R. 849 (1991).
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issue,' 7 3 the ECJ's reasoning shaped future debate on the Issue.
In Grogan, the ECJ labelled abortion a protected economic

right,1 74 and thereby laid the foundations for an affecting commerce Jurisprudential model to be available for use later.
A. The ECJand Protecting Services Jurisprudence
As the Judicial branch of the European Community, the ECJ
has the power to interpret and apply European Community
law. 175
Composed of thirteen Judges 1 76 and aided in the
interpretation of the EEC Treaty by six advocates general, 17 7 the
ECJ may review European Community acts and acts of Member
States. 178 Under Article 177, Member States' domestic courts
may refer questions regarding the interpretation of European
The Article 177 process,
Community law to the ECJ.1 79
therefore, is marked by shared jurisdiction between the ECJ and
domestic courts and relies on their cooperation. 180 Domestic
courts of Member States have disagreed whether ECJ preliminary

rulings constitute binding precedent.' 8 '

The ECJ has taken an active role in promoting the European
Community's overarching goals of free competition and economic

173. The ECJ's judgment in Grogan upheld the injunction granted by the Irish
High Court in Attorney General v. Open Door Counselling, 1988 I.R. 593. affd In
part 1988 I.R. 619, which prevented parties from distributing information to Irish
women about abortion clinics located in other Member States. See supra part
IV.A.
174. See Grogan, 3 C.M.L.R. 849,'at *32.
175. The ECJ is granted the general task of interpreting and applying the EEC
Treaty under Article 164. EEC Treaty, supra note 4. art. 164. Article 177
empowers the ECJ to give preliminary rulings concerning the interpretation of the
EEC Treaty, the validity of acts of Community institutions, and the interpretation
of statutes of bodies established by acts of the Council. Id. art. 177.
176. SCHERMERS & WAELBROECK, supra note 6, at 447. Although not required
under the EEC Treaty, each Member State is represented in the ECJ. Id. at 448.
This tradition recognizes that, although the ECJ performs a supranational role,
national interests of the Member States are also implicated. Id. at 449.
177. Id. at 453. The advocates general enjoy standing equal to that of the
judges. Id, In each case heard by the ECJ, at the closing of the oral procedure,
an advocate general renders an opinion which often serves as a starting point for
the Court's analysis. Id. at 454. Even when the ECJ disagrees, the advocate
general's opinion remains in the record, much like a dissenting opinion, as a
potentially potent tool for subsequent legal arguments. Id
178. STEINER, supra note 5, at 287-93. The Treaty empowers the ECJ to rule
only on matters of Community law and the ECJ does not have jurisdiction to
interpret Member States' domestic laws or to adjudicate the compatibility of their
laws with European Community laws. Id.
179. Id. EEC Treaty, supra note 4, art. 177. In fact, Article 177 references
constitute 40% to 50% of the ECJ's docket. STEINER, supranote 5. at 285.
180. STEINER, supra note 5. at 286.
181. SCHERMERS & WAELBROECK, supranote 6. at 440.
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integration.' 8 2 It has filled perceived gaps in the EEC Treaty and

interpreted provisions of the Treaty to maximize the realization of
these goals.' 8 3 The ECJ's expansive approach in interpreting
Articles 59 and 60, which guarantee European Community
citizens the right184to provide services, is a good example of the
Court's activism.

The text of Articles 59 and 60 guarantees only the freedom to
provide services, but the ECJ extended the reach of these articles
in Lulsi v. Mlnstero del Tesoro' 8 to protect the freedom both to
receive services and to travel to another Member State to receive
services. In so doing, the ECJ did not focus on whether the
activity at issue, medical treatment, was itself a substantive
guarantee under the EEC Treaty, but on whether this activity
could be characterized as a "service" for purposes of Articles 59
and 60.186 It found that medical treatment constituted a service
under the Article 60 definition of an activity normally provided for
remuneration, 1 8 7 and then extended the protections of Article 59
to -ensure access to this service.' 8 8
In addition, the ECJ
recognized that, as a necessary corollary to guaranteeing the
freedom to provide services, Articles 59 and 60 likewise protect
the right to receive services and to travel to other Member States
to obtain services. 1 89
The 1984 Lutsl decision established three important
propositions regarding the ECJ's approach to protecting services.
First, the ECJ indicated a willingness to examine challenged
activities to determine if they fit the concept of "service" under
Articles 59 and 60 and, if so, to extend the status of protected

182. Brian Wilkinson, Abortion, The Irish Constitution and the EEC, PUB. L. 20,
STEINER, supra note 5, at 289.
183. STEINER, supra note 5, at 18.

25 (Spring 1992);

184. See supra note 109 and accompanying text for the relevant portions of
Articles 59 and 60.
185. Joined Cases 286/82 & 26/83, 1984 E.C.R. 377. These two joined cases
involved challenges to an Italian law capping the amount of foreign currency that
could be exported from the state. Id.
186. Id. at 401-03.
187 Id.
188. Id. at 403.
189. The ECJ held in Lulsl:
[Tihe freedom to provide services includes the freedom, for the recipient of
services, to go to another Member State in order to receive a service there,
without being obstructed by restrictions, even in relation to payments and
that tourists, persons receiving medical treatment and persons travelling
for the purpose of education or business are to be regarded as recipients of
services.
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economic rights to such activities. 1 90 Second, the ECJ deemed
medical treatment a service for purposes of Articles 59 and 60.191
Third, by reading the Article 59 and 60 protections liberally, the
ECJ showed a readiness to protect a broad range of activities

associated with the providing of services. 192 All three of these
propositions resurfaced in the ECJ's SPUC v. Grogan19 3 opinion
in the context of the issue of access to abortion.
B. The SPUC v. Grogan Decislon
Although the Irish High Court initially approved a reference
to the ECJ of the European Community Issues implicated by
Grogan in 1989,194 the High Court did not provide the ECJ with
the relevant questions to be answered until early 1990.195 The
three questions presented all related to abortion as a service and
the degree to which access to such a service in another Member
State might be limited. The first and most important query for
the ECJ's review was whether the medical termination of a
pregnancy constituted a "service" protected under Article 60 of
the EEC Treaty. 196 The second inquired whether a Member State
could prohibit the distribution of information about abortion
clinics in other Member States. 19 7 The last question asked if
European Community law created the right for an individual in a
Member State that constitutionally ,prohibits abortion to
distribute information about abortion clinics in Member States
198
where such procedures are lawful.
Relying upon Lutst, both the ECJ and the Advocate General
concluded that the provision of abortions constituted a "service"
for purposes of Article 60.199 In answering the first question in
the affirmative, the ECJ rejected SPUC's argument that the

190.
191.
192.
193.
194.
195.
196.
197.

See Catherine Barnard, An Irish Solution, 142 NEw L. J. 532, 533 (1992).
LuLst, 1984 E.C.R. at 401.
Barnard, supra note 190, at 533.
3 C.M.L.R. 849.
See supra part IV.B.
Grogan, 3 C.M.L.R. 849, at *7.
Id. at *7.
The second question read:

In the absence of any measures providing for the approximation of the
laws of member-States concerning the organised [sic] activity or process of
carrying out an abortion or the medical termination of pregnancy, can a
member state prohibit the distribution of specific information about the
identity, location and means of communication with a specified clinic or
clinics in another member-State where abortions are performed?

Id.
198. Id.
199. Id. at "11, 32.

19941

IRISH ABORTION DEBATE

1147

immorality of abortion negated the claim that it was a service. 20 0
The ECJ noted that it was inappropriate for it to adjudicate the
morality of an activity; rather, that was the role of the domestic
legislature of each Member State. 2 0 '
The ECJ focused on
determining whether abortion was an economic right without
20 2
inquiring into substantive rights issues raised by the activity.
Although it defined abortion as a service under the EEC
Treaty, the ECJ nevertheless declined to extend the protections
of Article 59 to the informational activities of the student
unions. 20 3 In keeping with the European Community's focus on
economic freedom, the ECJ implicitly viewed Article 59 as
prohibiting restrictions on the economic right to supply services
such as abortion. 2 04 The ECJ found, however, that the link
between the student unions' activities and abortions carried out
in clinics located in other Member States was too tenuous to
constitute an economic relationship to which economic rights
attached. 20 5 Because no economic tie bound the student unions
to the abortion clinics, their distribution of information did not
constitute the exercise of an economic right, but a manifestation
of the freedom of expression. 20 6 Article 59 protects only economic rights, not the substantive right of freedom of
expression. 20 7 The ECJ held, therefore, that Article 59 did not
apply to the student unions' activities and that the restrictions
placed on the exercise of these activities did not contravene
20 8
European Community law.

200. Id. at *32.
201. Id.

202. See Id. at *32-34. The ECJ did not engage in any sort of substantive
rights analysis or balancing of the competing rights of the mother and the fetus.
ICL
203. Id. at *33-34.

204. Id.
205. Id. at *33.

On the ground of a lack of economic linkage, the ECJ

distinguished Grogan from Case 362/88, GB-Inno-BM v. Conf6d6ration du
Commerce Luxembourgeois, 1990 E.C.R. 667, in which the Court found an
advertising prohibition capable of constituting a barrier to the free movement of
goods and services. Grogan, 3 C.M.L.R. 849, at *33.
206. The ECJ deemed this freedom of expression to be independent of the
economic activities of the abortion clinics. Grogan, 3 C.M.L.R. 849,. at *33.
207. See supra note 109 and accompanying text.
208. Grogan, 3 C.M.L.R. 849, at *33. In conjunction with its consideration of
the applicability of Article 59, the ECJ also examined the Irish injunction in light
of Article 62, which holds that unless provided for in the Treaty, a Member State
may not introduce new restrictions on the freedom to provide services. EEC
Treaty, supra note 4, art. 62. The ECJ found the relevancy of Article 62 to depend
on whether Article 59 applied to the case. Because Article 59 did not, neither did
Article 62. Grogan, 3 C.M.L.R. 849, at *33.
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The Advocate General disagreed with the ECJ's analysis of
the applicability of Article 59 to this case and reasoned that
European Community law indeed could govern the ability of
Member States to prohibit access to abortion services. 20 9 In
contrast to the ECJ's narrow focus on the relationship between
the student unions and the abortion clinics, the Advocate General
believed that the proper inquiry was whether the prohibition on
information distribution adversely affected intra-Community
trade in services. 2 10
He opined that allowing measures
detrimental to intra-Community trade in services to fall beyond
the reach of Article 59 "would detract substantially from the
2 11
effectiveness of the principle of the free movement of services."
The Advocate General wanted to extend Article 59's scope to
include protecting the right to distribute information, whether or
2 12
not for remuneration.
The Advocate General then proceeded to analyze the extent
to which Article 59 could be invoked to safeguard access to information in light of the doctrine of derogation. 21 3 Article 56 of the
EEC Treaty, made applicable to Articles 59 and 60 by Article 66,
provides that Member States may derogate from the articles
relating to the supply of goods and services on grounds of "public

order, public safety and public health."214 The Advocate General
recognized that Ireland's ban on information regarding abortion
services involved a moral and philosophical policy choice that
entitled Ireland to the Article 56 exclusion. 21 5 To derogate from
the operation of Articles 59 and 60, however, a national law also
must comply with the principle of proportionality; that is, it must

209. Grogan, 3 C.M.L.R. 849, at *10-11.
210. Id. at *10. In contrast to the ECJ's focus on the relationship between the
clinics and the student organizations, the Advocate General, Walter van Gerven,
focused on the opposite side of the commercial equation, on the recipients of the
services and how restrictions limited their access to services. Dena T. Sacco &
AIexia Brown. Recent Development, 33 HARv.INT'L L.J. 291, 298 (1992).
211. Grogan, 3 C.M.L.R. 849, at "16. The Advocate General's view of Article
59's scope paralleled the view expressed previously by the ECJ in Case 186/87,
Cowan v. Tresor Public, 1989 E.C.R. 195.
212. Grogan, 3 C.M.L.R. 849, at *16.
213. Id. at *16-20.
214. Article 56 reads in relevant part: "The provisions of this Chapter and
measures taken in pursuance thereof shall not prejudice the applicability of...
provisions which lay down special treatment for foreign nationals and which are
justified by reasons of public order, public safety and public health." EEC Treaty,

supra note 4. art. 56.
Article 66 reads: "The provisions of Articles 55 to 58 inclusive shall apply to
the matters governed by this Chapter [which includes Articles 59 and 60]." Id.
art. 66.
215. Grogan, 3 C.M.L.R. 849, at *19. The Advocate General argued that the
fundamental rights enshrined in a Member State's constitution fell within a
sphere of autonomy with which Community law should not interfere. Id. at *20.
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be useful, indispensable, and the least restrictive means of
realizing the Member State's public policy goal. 2 16 The Advocate
General determined that Ireland's information ban met this
proportionality test and that the prohibition should therefore be
upheld. 2 17 Significantly, he hypothesized that a ban on the right
of a pregnant woman to travel to another Member State would fail
such a balancing test and so would not be a Justifiable derogation
from the protections of Article 59.218
VI. ANALYSIS: THE AFFECTING COMMERCE AND SUBSTANTIVE RIGHTS
MODELS COMPARED

The affecting commerce model posited by the ECJ and the
Irish Judiciary's substantive rights model, with its focus on the
content of the rights guaranteed by the Irish Constitution,

The Advocate General enunciated a two-prong test for determining
216. Id.
whether a law complies with the principle of proportionality. First, the national

law must be objectively necessary. Second, even if useful and indispensable, the
law must not have a disproportionate impact on European Community trade. Id.
217. Id.
218. Id. at *20-21. In addition to examining how the Irish restrictions
implicated Articles 59 and 60, the Advocate General analyzed the impact of the
restrictions under Article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights (the
Convention), which guarantees freedom of expression. Id. at *21-26 (citing
European Convention on Human Rights, art. 10). He found that the right to life of
the fetus outweighed the right to free expression. Id. at *27-28. Even if the
Advocate General or the ECJ had reached the opposite conclusion, however, this
would have meant little to Ireland because although Ireland is a signatory to the
Convention, the Irish Parliament has never given domestic effect to the
Convention; therefore; in accordance with Article 29.6 of the Irish Constitution,
Ireland is not bound by the Convention's provisions. Wilkinson, supra note 182,
at 24 n.23; Butler & Gregory, supra note 18, at 441-42.
The implications of the Advocate General's reasoning, however, were
worrisome because the primary goals of and protections afforded by the
Community and the EEC Treaty are economic in nature, but the Convention
focuses on human rights. Were the ECJ to follow the lead suggested by the
Advocate General and use the Convention to provide content to general
Community principles, it essentially would be introducing fundamental
noneconomic personal rights considerations into Community jurisprudence. This
would increase the ECJ's mandate drastically and concomitantly decrease the
scope of Member State laws not susceptible to ECJ review. See generally Phelan,
supra note 4, at 681-89. Because Ireland has given effect to the EEC Treaty, any
incorporation of the Convention into European Community law would bind
Ireland.
In 1992 the European Court of Human Rights held that the injunction granted
by the Irish judiciary in Attorney General v. Open Door Counselling, 1988 I.R.
593, affd in part, 1988 I.R. 619, violated Article 10 of the Convention. Freedom to
Receive and Impart Information Violated by Ireland, THE TIMEs (London), Nov. 5,
1992 (Features), at 42.
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present two contrasting jurisprudential visions of how to examine
the Irish abortion issue. Each model seeks to protect a different
package of rights associated with the process of obtaining an
abortion, and each model has different limits on the extent of the
freedoms it affords. Application of the affecting commerce and
substantive rights analytical approaches, therefore, translates
into vastly divergent paths for the evolution of abortion rights in
Ireland. In 1992, these two jurisprudential models, each with its
different package of protected rights, formed the framework for
the Irish public debate on abortion. The role of jurisprudential
thinking in shaping public discussion was extremely clear.
A. Implications of the ECJ'sAffecting Commerce Model
Derided by some as an unnecessarily narrow decision, 219 the
ECJ's ruling in Grogan nevertheless yielded results. The ECJ
transformed cross-border access to abortion into an economic
right protected by the EEC Treaty. In the wake of Grogan, the
abortion issue could no longer be characterized purely as a
matter of substantive individual rights under Irish law; now
abortion had been cast as a "service" within the web of European
Community commercial relations. 220 The ECJ's concern was that
access to abortion in other Member States not be impeded.
Although the ECJ declined to address the issues in Grogan, its
holding in Lulsl suggested that it would interpret Article 59 to
protect a woman's right to travel to another Member State to
receive an abortion and her right to receive information about the
availability of abortions. 22 ' The Court indicated that it would not
inquire into the moral, ethical, and philosophical content of the
substantive right to an abortion. 222 Instead, the ECJ's inquiry
would be whether a restriction impinged on transborder access to
abortion services: whether a law affected commerce. 22 The
ECJ's affecting commerce jurisprudence thus holds out a
potential guarantee of Community protection to a package of
rights relating to abortion access. This package includes the
rights to obtain information about abortion services in Member
States where abortions are legal and to travel to these states for
such procedures. 224 Any restrictions upon these rights may be
examined by the ECJ for a determination of whether the law in
question violates European Community law.
219. Barnard, supra note 190, at 533.

220. SPUC v. Grogan, 3 C.M.L.R. 849, at *32.
221. Barnard, supra note 190, at 533.
222. Grogan, 3 C.M.L.R. 849, at *32.
223. See generally Phelan, supranote 4, at 673-75.

224. See generally Id. at 676.
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Limits exist, however, upon the ECJ's ability to guarantee
access to services. As the Advocate General pointed out in his
accompanying opinion to Grogan, Article 56 allows Member
States to derogate from the commands of Articles 59 and 60 "on
grounds of public policy, public security or public health."2 25 The
import of this exception is that the domestic law of a Member
State may trump European Community law if it meets the
requisite proportionality test.2 26

Certain domestic regulations

therefore may be beyond the reach of ECJ action, even when they
affect transborder access to services, as long as the Member State
successfully can assert "public policy" grounds as the reason for
the regulations. 2 27 This ability to derogate leaves Member States
with potentially a great deal of autonomy, which in turn limits the
ability of the ECJ to attack laws that affect commerce.
In that manner, domestic public policy could circumscribe
the rights protected by Articles 59 and 60. The ECJ and the
Advocate General having made Irish abortion restrictions
vulnerable to challenges that such rules affected commerce, the
Irish government reacted swiftly to the Grogan ruling. The Prime
Minister negotiated a special EEC Treaty protocol, known as
"Protocol 17," with the other European Community Member
States confirming that the Maastricht Treaty would not affect
Article 40.3.3 of the Irish Constitution. 2 2s This Protocol created

in essence a form of automatic derogation whereby European
Community law would not apply to Irish abortion issues, for by
its instructions the ECJ could no longer supersede Irish law on
2 29
matters relating to abortion.
While a Member State may argue that its regulation
represents a proper derogation from European Community law,
the ECJ retains discretion to decide whether such a claim is
valid.23 0 The ECJ thus maintains significant power over how
much deviation from European Community law Member States
will be allowed in pursuing their public policies. Recognizing the
threat to equality of access presented by derogation, the ECJ has
construed the concept of "public policy" grounds strictly,

225. Grogan, 3 C.M.L.R. 849, at *17 (quoting EEC Treaty, supra note 4, art.

56).
226. Id. at *17.
227. Id.
228 Walter Ellis, Yes or No to the Irish Question?, THE TIMES (London), June
16, 1992 (Features).
229. Id.

230. SCHERMERS & WAELBROECK, supranote 6, at 93-94.
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requiring a showing of a "genuine and sufficiently serious threat
affecting one of the fundamental interests of society."2 1
In the context of the Irish abortion debate, the principle of
derogation allows Ireland to claim an exemption from Articles 59
32
and 60 for laws limiting access to abortion procedures.
However, the ECJ ultimately will determine whether derogation is
justified and whether the restrictions are proportional. 2 33 Under
the affecting commerce model and the Grogan ruling, any time a
domestic law relating to abortion implicates access to European
Community services in any manner, the ECJ can be called upon
to review the validity of the law. 2 34 Given the Advocate General's
approval of derogation in the context of Irish abortion regulations,
Protocol 17, the explicit guarantees of Article 40.3.3, the popular
referendum method by which this amendment was adopted, and
the overwhelming Catholic population of Ireland, it is arguable,
but not certain, that Ireland might be allowed to derogate on
public policy grounds from the requirements of Articles 59 and
60.235 The ECJ might, however, hesitate to find that invalidating
restrictions on the rights to travel and to give or receive information about abortion constitutes a threat to Ireland's policy against
abortion, for to do so would place such Irish laws beyond the
ECJ's grasp. 36 Lulsi indicates that, if the ECJ denied Article 56
exemptions to Ireland, the ECJ likely would strike down
restrictions on activities, such as travelling and giving or receiving
information about abortion clinics, that relate to the termination
of a pregnancy and have European Community economic
effects. 23 7 Through ECJ review then, the European Community
enjoys ultimate authority to pass on many of the means Ireland

231. Case 30/77, Regina v. Pierre Bouchereau. 1977 E.C.R. 1999, 2014; 2
C.M.L.R. 800, 825 (1977).
232. See generally Phelan, supra note 4,at 676.
.233. See Advocate General's Opinion in SPUC v. Grogan, 3 C.M.L.R. 849, at
*17-20 ("Justified" test), 20-21 (proportionality test).
234. See Phelan, supranote 4, at 681-86.
235. By deciding that the student unions essentially lacked standing to assert

the protections of Articles 59 and 60. the ECJ avoided the question of whether
Article 40.3.3 of the Irish Constitution could be considered a valid derogation on a
public policy ground. See Grogan, 3 C.M.L.R. 849, at *33.
The Advocate General in his accompanying opinion, in which the Issue of
derogation was squarely addressed, noted that the public policy grounds that in

previous cases had been found to allow derogation included those grounds
reflecting political and economic choices connected with national soclo-cutural

characteristics. Id. at 18.
236. The Advocate General certainly would hesitate to make that finding as
Indicated by his recognition of Article 40.3.3 as valid public policy grounds for
derogation from the coverage of Articles 59 and 60. Grogan, 3 C.M.L.R. 849, at

019-20.
237. See supra part V.A.

1994]

IRISH ABORTION DEBATE

1153

chooses to further the protections afforded to the rights of the
23 8
unborn under Article 40.3.3 of its constitution.
As noted previously, while ECJ decisions are extremely

influential, they are only advisory opinions; enforcement remains

23 9
with the domestic courts and legislatures of Member States.
The Irish judiciary therefore at least could lessen the impact of
ECJ decisions to harmonize better with its vision of the Irish
Constitution. 240 In his opinion in Grogan, Chief Justice Finlay
indicated that if the ECJ ruled that European Community law
protected the activities of the student unions, the consequences
of that decision as it affected constitutional rights would fall to
consideration by the Irish judiciary. 24 1 Justice Walsh, in his
concurrence, noted the filtering role to be played by the Irish
judiciary when faced with an ECJ decision implicating the Irish
Constitution. 24 2 He indicated that, in the end, only the Irish
Supreme Court could decide what effects European Community
law would have on Article 40.3.3.243
Justice Walsh also
expressed the view that the economic objectives of the
Community should not subsume national laws dealing with
moral issues. 24 4
This dicta calls into question just how
vigorously the Irish judiciary would apply ECJ rulings it found in
conflict with Article 40.3.3.
Leaving the moral questions raised by abortion aside, the fact
of the ECJ's sitting in judgment on how a state chooses to protect
fundamental rights seems at odds with the notion of the
European Community as a primarily economic entity composed
of autonomous Member States. The European Community has

238. See generally Phelan, supra note 4, at 670.
239. SCHERMERS & WAELBROECK, supra note 6, at 311-12.
240. See SPUC v. Grogan, 1989 I.R. 760, at *10 (Walsh, J., concurring).
241. Id. at *7.
242. See Id. at *10. Justice Walsh retired from the Irish Supreme Court

shortly after penning his concurrence in this case. Charleton, supra note 11, at

371.
243. Grogan, 1989 I.R. 760, at *10-11.
244. Justice Walsh wrote:
The fact that particular activities even grossly immoral ones [specifically
abortion), may be permitted to a greater or lesser extent in some member

states does not mean that they are considered to be within the objectives
of the treaties of the European Communities, particularly the Treaty of

Rome, which is the Treaty of the European Economic Community. A
fortiori it cannot be one of the objectives of the European Communities
that a member state should be obliged to permit activities which are
clearly designed to set at nought the constitutional guarantees for the
protection within the State of a fundamental human right.
Id. at *11.
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no Bill of Rights, 245 yet the end result of deeming abortion a
service is roughly analogous to the result of United States
Supreme Court's decision in Roe v. Wade 2 46 finding the right to
terminate a pregnancy protected by the Constitution; the ECJ, in

effect, can guarantee to some extent the right of an Irish woman
to privacy by protecting her right to receive an abortion in a
2 47
Member State where abortions are legal.

The implicit limit on the privacy right thus afforded by the
EEC Treaty is that this right can be exercised only outside Ireland
2 48
by those who can afford to travel to another Member State.

The ECJ cannot reach the core fundamental rights to life of the
woman and the fetus protected by Article 40.3.3 as long as these

rights remain domestic and services in another Member State are
not implicated. 2 49

Nonetheless, under the affecting commerce

model, the ECJ can guarantee a "fundamental" right of access to
abortion that directly conflicts with Irish constitutional
guarantees. 2 5 0 One must inquire if this power is consistent with
the overarching vision of the European Community. 2 51 Is the
European Community central authority meant to be so extensive
and the ECJ so powerful a guarantor of Community
25 2
"fundamental" rights?

245. Phelan, supra note 4, at 676.
246. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
247. As of the ECJ's decision in SPUC v. Grogan, 3 C.M.L.R. 849. Ireland was
the only Member State not to allow legal abortions under circumstances other
than a threat to the life of the woman. Charleton, supra note 11, at 366. In the
wake of the referendum, Ireland remains the sole Member State to forbid
abortions. Id. See Infra part VI.C.
248. Professor Brilmayer has noted that prior to Roe v. Wade, when the
legality of abortions varied from state to state, women with knowledge of states
that allowed abortion and with money for travel could obtain abortions, but those
with less information or money could not, leaving them no recourse but the back
alley. Lea Brilmayer, Interstate Preemption: The Right to Travel, the Right to Lffe,

and the Right to Die, 91 MICH. L. REv. 873, 878-79 (1993); see also Seth F.
Kreimer, The Law of Choice and Choice of Law: Abortion, the Right to Travel, and
ExtraterritorialRegulation in American Federalism,67 N.Y.U. L. REV. 451 (1992).
249. However, even the purely domestic fundamental rights protected by
Article 40.3.3 theoretically are vulnerable to ECJ review. See Wilkinson, supra
note 182, at 27.
250. See Phelan. supra note 4, at 684-86.
251. See generally Id. at 688-89. Professor Phelan perceives the logical end of
the rationale employed by the ECJ in Grogan ultimately to be the shaping of
national fundamental rights according to the role of Member States within the EC
economic structure. Id.
252. Professor Phelan is critical of such a development and has proposed a
counterbalancing jurisdictional rule for the ECJ, giving greater weight to the
principle of derogation, and effectively creating a form of reverse preemption. Id.
at 687-88. The rule reads:
The special type of rights embedded in national constitutions which
are considered by the national courts (a) to express basic principles
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B. Implications of the Irish Substantive Rights Model
The implications of the Irish substantive rights model in
many ways mirror the issues presented by the affecting
commerce model. The Irish judiciary's substantive rights inquiry
examines the protection of unenumerated rights based on a
reading of the constitution in light of the demands of modern
times. 25 3 In X, the Irish Supreme Court employed this approach
to arrive at a result that for the first time allowed abortion to take
place in Ireland legally. 25 4 In striking a balance between the
competing rights to life of the woman and the fetus under Article
40.3.3, the court made clear, however, that abortions were

available only in cases in which the woman faced a "real and
substantial risk" avoidable only by termination of the
pregnancy. 2 55 Reasoning that only the right to life of the woman
could supplant the right to life of the fetus, the court also noted
that the woman's right to travel could be restricted to protect the
life of the fetus.. 5 6
Earlier, in Open Door Counselling, the
Supreme Court granted an injunction preventing the provision of
information regarding abortion. 25 7
The package of rights
guaranteed under the Irish substantive rights model was,
therefore, completely at odds with that guaranteed by the ECJ's
affecting commerce model. The Irish judiciary allowed some
abortions within Ireland, but limited access to these procedures
abroad by restricting the right to travel, 2 58 the right to provide
25 9
information, and, implicitly, the right to receive information.
Given the amorphous nature of the analysis under the
substantive rights model and the lack of legislative guidance on
the subject, the rights to travel and to provide and receive
information were not afforded any permanent guarantees. Since

concerning life, liberty, religion and the family; (b) to have as their
interpretive teleology a national vision of personhood and morality; and (c)

to be fundamental to the legitimacy of the national legal system and the
preservation of its concept of law;

take precedence

over European

Community law within their field of application.

Id. at 688.
253.
254.
255.
256.
257.
IV.A.2.

See supra part IV.
See supra part IV.C.
Attorney General v. X, 1992 I.R. 1, at *13.
Id. at *16; see supra part IV.C.2c.
Attorney General v. Open Door Counseling. 1988 I.R. 619; see suprapart

258. As Professor Brilmayer points out, the state Is not denying its citizens

the right to travel, but demanding that citizens follow its laws even when absent

from the state. Brilmayer, supra note 248, at 883.
259. See supra part IV.A.
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the passage of Article 40.3.3 in 1983, the Irish Parliament has
failed to furnish any guidance on how to enforce the
Amendment's protections; perforce the courts have fashioned
their own vision of the scope of Article 40.3.3. As has been noted
in the context of United States Supreme Court jurisprudence
regarding unenumerated rights, a lack of textual guidance frees
the judiciary from the moorings of the constitution and allows it
to substitute to a greater degree its own subjective appraisal of
what rights should or should not be protected. 2 60 The text of
Article 40.3.3 provides no indication of how and to what extent
the competing rights of the woman and fetus should be
protected. 2 6 1 Moreover, until 1993, no other parliamentary

guidance in the form of laws or regulations existed to aid the
Judiciary in channelling its consideration of abortion.262 The
missing directions from the constitution and the laws combined
with the Irish courts' tradition of activist review give the judiciary
tremendous latitude in considering abortion issues. 2 63 This
virtually unfettered discretion meant greater judicial subjectivity,
which in turn hampered the consistency of the judiciary's
2 4
approach to abortion. 6
Beyond the problem of a lack of standards to follow in
examining abortion issues, the fundamental separation of powers
question, whether creating a right to obtain an abortion is a
proper exercise of judicial authority, remained. After all, Article
40.3.3 was passed partially in response to fears that the Irish
Judiciary might take the bit in its mouth and run with the
abortion issue.2 6 5 The Irish Constitution endowed Parliament,
260. Justice Black, objecting to the notion of Supreme Court Justices as
Platonic Guardians, noted in his dissent in Griswoldv. Connecticut:
[If] these formulas based on "natural justice" . . . are to prevail, they
require judges to determine what is or is not constitutional on the basis of
their own appraisal of what laws are unwise or unnecessary. The power to
make such decisions is of course that of a legislative body.... II] do not
believe that we are granted power.., to measure constitutionality by our
belief that the legislation is arbitrary, capricious or unreasonable, or
accomplishes no Justifiable purpose, or is offensive to our notions of
"civilized standards of conduct."
381 U.S. 479, 511-13 (1965) (Black, J., dissenting).
261. Charleton, supranote 11, at 357.
262. The lack of legislative guidance is in stark contrast with the wealth of
laws passed to protect other personal rights. Id. at 351.
263. Id. at 352.

264, For instance, consider the directly opposite results of Chief Justice
Finlay's and Justice Hederman's applications of the "real and substantial risk"
standard in X, with Finlay finding the risk to the mother to be paramount and

Hederman finding that the interests of the fetus trumped those of the mother.
Attorney General v. X, 1992 I.R. 1, at *14, 27-28.
265. See Quinlan, supra note 60, at 379-82.
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not the judiciary, with the power to make laws. 26 6 Some
commentators have argued that in interpreting Article 40.3.3, the
2 67
Supreme Court was supplanting the legislative process.
The problems with the substantive rights model as applied to
the abortion issue extended beyond the Irish domestic scene. In
holding the fetus's right to life paramount to the woman's right to
travel or to obtain information, the Irish judiciary in essence set
prohibitions on precisely those rights the ECJ sought to protect.
Moreover, as the Supreme Court never recognized that the
protections afforded to the fetus by the constitution ended at the
Irish border, it could be accused of exporting the effects of these
prohibitions to other Member States. By an amendment passed
in 1972, Ireland had agreed that European Community law
preempted even the Irish Constitution. 2 68 The ECJ ruling in
Grogan, interpreting the European Community law regarding
access to services, therefore, should have been taken by the
Supreme Court as instruction that European Community law
preempted Member State restrictions on the right to travel or to
obtain information. Instead, the Irish Supreme Court in X
endorsed travel restrictions and, in a separate action, refused to
lift the injunction on providing information. 26 9 The Irish judiciary
and the ECJ thus appeared to be on a jurisprudential collision

course over rights relating to abortion. This collision, as it turned
out, would occur in the forum of public vote rather than in the
context of an actual case.

266. IR. CONST. art. 15.2, reprintedIn 8 CONSTITUTIONS OF THE COUNTRIES OF THE
WORLD (IRELAND), supra note 14, at 34.
267. Charleton, supranote 11, at 375.
268. IR. CONsT. art. 29.4.3. reprinted in 8 CONSTITUTIONS OF THE COUNTRIES OF
THE WORLD (IRELAND), supra note 14, at 56. This Article reads in relevant part:
'No provision of this Constitution invalidates laws enacted, acts done or measures
adopted by the State necessitated by the obligations of membership of the
Communities or prevents laws enacted, acts done or measures adopted by the
Communities, or institutions thereof, from having the force of law in the State."
Id.
269. Despite the 1992 referendum result, see Infra part VI.C., the injunction
prohibiting the distribution of information regarding abortion services outside
Ireland remained in place. The High Court issued a fresh ban in August 1992,
even though this ruling contradicted the referendum's results. The High Court
reasoned that all matters relating to the Maastricht Treaty, of which it considered
the right to information about services to be one, would take effect only once the
Treaty came into effect. Alan Murdoch, Fresh Ban on Abortion Information In
Ireland, INDEPENDENT (London), Aug. 8, 1992, at 3.
The Supreme Court subsequently rejected an application to overturn the order
on grounds that it lacked jurisdiction to hear the matter. Christine Newman.
Supreme Court Retains Ban on Travel and Information, IR. TIMES. July 21, 1993, at
2.
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C. The Referendum: Choosing a Model
In early 1992, events conspired to make a resolution of the
questions surrounding abortion imperative for Ireland. Part of
the momentum for a solution could be traced directly to the X
case. The compelling facts of the case and the Supreme Court's
ruling focused national attention on abortion as well as on the
glaring lack of legislation to address the issue. 2 70
Justice

McCarthy's call for legislative action in X did not fall on deaf

ears. 2 71 The debate sparked by X also spilled over into the
question of European unity.2 7 2 In the wake of Grogan observers
recognized that the Maastricht Treaty, representing the next stage
in the process of European Community unification, had potential
ramifications for the ability of Irish women to travel and to obtain
information. 27 3 After bitter public debate in which abortion
figured prominently, the Irish public resoundingly voted in favor
of the Maastricht Treaty in the summer of 1992.274 This vote
indicated that the Irish public valued European unity more highly
than preventing access to abortions outside of Ireland. 2 75 The
Maastricht vote, however, did not provide any legislative guidance
as to how to deal with abortion. Recognizing that a legislative
hole, which European unity provided even greater impetus to fill,
still existed, the Irish prime minister decided to hold a
referendum for the public to voice its preferences on abortion. 276
These preferences then would be incorporated into the
constitution to provide the Irish judiciary at last with textual
guidelines for considering abortion issues.
The referendum held in late 1992 presented Irish voters with
the three central questions previously before the Supreme Court
and the ECJ:

270 Ireland;Mercy Straln'd,ECONOMIST. Oct. 24, 1992. at 59.
271. See supranote 146 and accompanying text.
272. Ray Moseley, Irish Mix: Abortion, Euro-unity, CHI. TRIB., May 31, 1992, §
1, at 17.
273. David Gardner, Danes' Maastricht Vote 'Will Jolt Irish': Prime Minister
Seeks to Rally Liberals to Yes-Vote by Re-establishing Link with Freer Access to
Abortion, FIN. TIMES. June 6, 1992, at 2.
274. James F. Clarity, Irish Vote Backs European Treaty, Giving New Life to
Planfor Unity, N.Y. TIMES, June 20, 1992, at 1.
275. See Clarity, supra note 274.

276. The Irish Constitution provides for amendment by popular referendum
under Article 27. IR. CONST. art. 27, reprinted In 8 CONSTITUTIONS OF THE
COUNTRIES OF THE WORLD (IRELAND), supra note 14. at 50-52.
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1.

Should a right to an abortion exist when there is a "real
and substantial risk" to the life of the woman?

2.

Should a woman have the right to travel to another
country to terminate a pregnancy?

3.

Should there be a right to distribute or receive
information
on the availability of legal abortions
27 7
abroad?

Irish voters rejected the first amendment but approved the latter
27 8
two addressing the rights to travel and to information.

VII.

CONCLUSION

The Irish public thus embraced the package of rights
protected under the ECJ's affecting commerce model with its
emphasis on equality of transborder access to services. Given the
pro-Maastricht vote earlier in the year, with its clear mandate in
favor of continuing the process of European unity, this result was
not surprising. The referendum result achieved a new certainty
regarding the rights to travel and to information and made Irish
law consistent with the European Community goals of economic

integration.

The amendments also put Irish women on a more

equal plane with women from other Member States as far as the
access rights now guaranteed to them.
One must ask, of course, at what price these accomplishments were purchased. While the European Community could
not and did not command Ireland to change its laws, it nevertheless exerted pressure on Ireland to conform to the practices fol-

277. Abbie Jones, DramaticVote: Ireland to ConsiderLiberalizingAbortion, CHI.
TRiB., Nov. 22, 1992, § 6 at 1.

278. Geraldine Kennedy, Abortion Issue Is Heavily Defeated, IR. TiMES, Nov. 30,
1992 (Home News), at 6. The vote percentages were as follows:
1. Right to abortion
2. Right to travel
3. Right to information

For
34.6
62.3
59.9

Against
65.4
37.7
40.1

Id.

In the wake of the Supreme Court's ruling in X, the Irish government also
sought to soften the effects of Protocol 17 by adding interpretive language
indicating that the protocol would not limit the right to travel nor the right to

obtain information in Ireland about services lawfully available in other Member
States. This declaration was approved by the 12 foreign ministers of the Member
States in May 1992. EC: The Twelve Approve the Solemn DeclarationInterpreting
the IrishProtocolon Abortion, AGENCE EuR., May 5, 1992.
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lowed by other Member States individually and by the
Community as a whole, In seeking to protect economic rights
relating to access to services, the ECJ essentially instructed
Ireland on the extent to which Ireland could protect fundamental
substantive rights guaranteed under its constitution. While
perfectly within the ECJ's mandate to condemn Member State
restrictions that affect commerce, the exercise of this power is
troubling when it impinges on laws promulgated by Member
States to protect values enshrined as fundamental in their
constitutions. By characterizing rights as economic and limits on
these rights as affecting commerce, the ECJ may review domestic
restrictions addressed to protecting fundamental rights, as long
as these laws affect the European Community economy to some
degree. This happened to Ireland in Grogan. A more expansive
exercise of ECJ review, therefore, is likely to translate into greater
homogeneity of rights among Member States, which perhaps
tracks the even more closely united Community envisioned in the
Maastricht Treaty. The affecting commerce model, therefore, is a
potentially powerful jurisprudential tool to accomplish the ends of
European Community unity.
The result of the application of the affecting commerce model

necessarily is much greater control exercised by the central
European Community authority over the laws passed by Member
States. This same development has marked the relationship of
the United States federal government and state governments in
the past thirty years, as the United States judiciary has used the
affecting commerce jurisprudential model to strike down state
laws that implicated federally guaranteed rights. 27 9 Criticism has
been levelled at the use of this model in the United States as
having put too many state laws within the review and grasp of the
federal judiciary. 2 80 The affecting commerce approach has been
argued to enchance federal power at the price of state autonomy. 2 8 ' The European Community is organized along looser lines
than the United States, with a supposedly lesser degree of control
to be exercised by the central authorities over the Member States.

279. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, supra note 1. § 5-5; Butler &
Gregory, supranote 18, at 431.

280. "The growth of the federal police power based on the commerce clause
disrupts the delicately balanced federal system. As federal power expands, state
governments are displaced from their traditional role as the primary authority
over individuals." Alan N. Greenspan, Note, The Constitutional Exercise of the
FederalPolice Power: A FunctionalApproach to Federalism, 41 VAND. L. REv. 1019,
1021 (1988).
281. The effect of federal encroachment on state autonomy has been that
"(llndividuals increasingly are governed by a large federal bureaucracy that is not
as accountable, democratic, or responsive as state and local governments and
which cannot provide for local diversity." Id.

19941
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If the affecting commerce model does aggregate power in the

central authorities at the expense of member autonomy, this
jurisprudential tool is also a potential danger to the original'
vision of the European Community.
And what about the substantive rights model employed by
the Irish judiciary? Is there still a place for this approach in the
wake of the referendum's elevation of the affecting commerce
model? The answer is yes, but clearer textual boundaries will
exist now to guide and to limit the judiciary in its inquiries into
the extent of the substantive rights protected by the
constitution. 2 8 2
This guidance probably is a welcome
developfnent for the Irish judiciary, which clearly has been aware
of the problems of having to work in a legal vacuum. Of course
with the benefit of greater certainty comes the detriment of less
flexibility. The Irish judiciary will not enjoy the same degree of
latitude in interpreting the substantive content of its constitution
as the United States Supreme Court has possessed in the
aftermath of Roe v. Wade. Instead, the Irish judiciary has been
instructed that the ban on the availability of abortion procedures
in Ireland is absolute. The substantive content of Article 40.3.3,
as it regards the protections afforded the right to life of the fetus,
has been enunciated clearly for the court. If faced today with the
facts of the X case, the Irish Supreme Court, working under the
guidelines of the new amendments, would be hard pressed to
fashion a line of reasoning to allow the termination of a
pregnancy in Ireland in medical emergencies. The need for
flexibility in approaching abortion issues, however, largely has
been ameliorated by these same amendments, as a woman now
may freely leave Ireland to obtain an abortion elsewhere. In a
very real sense, the Irish judiciary may not be faced with deciding
many abortion issues in the coming years.

282. The 13th and 14th Amendments to the Irish Constitution, codifying the
popular referendum result, have been incorporated into Article 40.3.3 to read:
The State acknowledges the right to life of the unborn and, with due regard

to the equal right to life of the mother, guarantees in its laws to respect,
and, so far, as practicable, by its laws to defend and vindicate that right.
This subsection shall not limit freedom to travel between the State and
another State.
This subsection shall not limit freedom to obtain or make available, in the
State, subject to such conditions as may be laid down by law, information
relating to services lawfully available in another State.
IR. CONST. art. 40.33. reprinted In Maurice Collins, Legal Fall-Out From Eighth
Amendment Sure to Go On, IR. TIMES, July 23, 1993 (Sound & Vision), at 13.
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Although the substantive rights model now seemingly will
have less value than the affecting commerce model in considering
how issues relating to abortion will be examined in the coming
years by the Irish judiciary and the ECJ, it is clear that both
jurisprudential approaches have been extremely influential in
shaping the tenor of the Irish abortion debate. The two models
have provided the intellectual molds into which the courts, the
debate participants, and commentators might pour the
ingredients of their thoughts and feelings about abortion into
shapes that conform to constitutional doctrine and theory. The
resulting models have incorporated different constitutional values
and different views of how European Community laws ought to
weigh into the balance. The affecting commerce model currently
holds sway, but the elevation of one approach by no means
destroys the other. Both the substantive rights and affecting
commerce models will continue to be influential in shaping
debates over how to protect individual rights.

Anne M. Hilbert

